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Abstract: 
We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions 
and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that 
associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategy-
proof rules on restricted domains of preferences, as the domains of additively representable or 
separable preferences. In such domains, only single-lapping rules satisfy strategy-proofness, 
individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. Single-lapping rules are characterized by 
severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions. These restrictions are consistent with 
hierarchical organizations and imply that single-lapping rules always select core-stable 
partitions. Thus, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of 
strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of core-stability. We analyze the implications of 
our results for matching problems 
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1 Introduction
We study simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned
into coalitions and agents have preferences over the coalitions they are members of. Fol-
lowing the terminology proposed by Dre`ze and Greensberg [10], we focus on problems
characterized by the “hedonic” aspect of coalition formation. Agents’ preferences only
depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they belong to. Hence, we exclude
the existence of externalities among different coalitions. Relevant examples of such prob-
lems are matching problems such as marriage and roommate problems, or the formation
of social clubs, teams, and societies.
The formation of coalitions is a relevant phenomenon in a wide variety of social and
economic environments. The rationale behind the formation of coalitions is that agents
form groups in order to exploit the joint benefits of cooperation. The literature on Coali-
tional Game Theory has extensively analyzed the existence of stable partitions in hedonic
coalition formation problems.1 Instead, we propose a social choice and implementation
approach. We study coalition formation rules that associate to each profile of agents’ pref-
erences a partition of the group of agents. A coalition formation rule can be interpreted
as an optimal recommendation for the society that represents an optimal compromise
between the conflicting preferences of the agents. However, since preferences are not ob-
servable, they must be elicited from the agents. Thus, given a coalition formation rule,
a fundamental concern is whether or not agents have the incentive to reveal their true
preferences. In this paper, we analyze the possibility of devising coalition formation rules
that always give agents such an incentive. Hence, we are interested in rules that satisfy
strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness is the strongest decentrability property. It implies
that it is a dominant strategy for the agents to straight-forwardly reveal their preferences.
Moreover, each agent needs to know only her own preferences to compute her best choice.
It is well known that the requirements of strategy-proofness are hard to meet. In the
abstract model of social choice, Gibbard [12] and Satterthwaite [17] show that –provided
there are more than two alternatives at stake– every strategy-proof social choice rule is
dictatorial. However, reasonable strategy-proof rules exist if appropriate restrictions are
imposed on agents’ preferences. In coalition formation problems, such domain restrictions
1For further references, see the recent works by Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez [3], Barbera` and
Gerber [4], Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6], and Pa´pai [15].
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arise naturally. On the one hand, while coalition formation rules select a partition for
each preference profile, each agent only cares about the coalition she is a member of. On
the other hand, additional restrictions on how an agent may compare different coalitions
can be easily justified. For instance, an interesting class of problems consists of situations
in which there are no complementarities among the members of a coalition. That is, the
preferences of an agent i regarding the convenience of an agent j joining the coalition
i belongs to, do not depend on the coalition to which i is assigned.2 Then, agents’
preferences are additively representable or separable. These domains of preferences have
been studied in the general context of abstract social choice by Barbera`, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou [5] and Le Breton and Sen [13], among others, and positive results have been
obtained. Yet, the possibility of constructing strategy-proof coalition formation rules
when agents’ preferences are additively representable or separable has not been addressed
in the literature.
Besides strategy-proofness, we would like our rules to satisfy three additional prop-
erties. Our rules should be individually rational, non-bossy, and flexible. Individual
rationality is a participation constraint. It means that no agent should ever be worse-off
than she would be if staying alone. Non-bossiness is a collusion-proof requirement. It says
that if a change in an agent’s preferences does not affect the coalition to which this agent
is assigned, then the remaining agents are also unaffected by this change of preferences.
Flexibility is a minimal efficiency requirement. It says that every partition formed by a
collection of feasible coalitions belongs to the range of the rule. Hence, flexibility implies
that feasible disjoint coalitions are mutually compatible.
We characterize a family of rules, the family of single-lapping rules, that fulfill the
previous axioms in minimally rich domains of preferences (as the domain of additively
representable preferences). Single-lapping rules are characterized by strong restrictions
over the set of feasible coalitions –the single-lapping property–. These restrictions can
be justified by the initial existence of a hierarchical structure of the society that implies
that some coalitions can never be formed. These restrictions imply a trade-off between
strategy-proofness and efficiency. However, single-lapping rules always select core-stable
2Think, for example, in the preferences of a senior member of an Economics Department about the
job–candidates for two tenure–track positions that are available (but that need not to be filled). Suppose
that there are two candidates, a macroeconomist and an econometrician. If the senior economist prefers
hiring the macroeconomist rather than not hiring anybody, then the senior economist should also prefer
hiring the macroeconomist and the econometrician rather than hiring the econometrician alone.
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partitions of the society, in the sense that no feasible coalition of agents unanimously
prefer joining each other rather than staying at the coalition they are assigned to. Hence,
our main result provides further evidence on the relation between the non-cooperative
game theory concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative game theory concept of
the core-stability.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we review the most related literature.
Pa´pai [15] introduces the single-lapping property, and shows that it is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a unique core-stable partition of the society. This
author also shows that, given an initial set of coalitions that satisfy the single-lapping
property, its associated single-lapping rule is the unique rule that satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and a weak version of efficiency when agents’ prefer-
ences over coalitions are restricted to prefer any coalition in the initial set to any other
coalition. Our analysis complements Pa´pai’s results. We show that the single-lapping
structure of the set of feasible coalition is implied directly by strategy-proofness and the
remaining axioms. Moreover, the results also hold in restricted domains of preferences
over coalitions.
The manipulability of coalition formation rules has also been studied by Alcalde and
Revilla [2], Cechla´rova´ and Romero-Medina [7], So¨nmez [19], and Takamiya [20]. How-
ever, these works focus on different domains of preferences that are not consistent with
additively representable or separable preferences. More specifically, Alcalde and Revilla
[2], Cechla´rova´ and Romero-Medina [7] assume that agents’ preferences over coalitions are
based on the best or the worst group of agents in each coalition. In these environments,
they prove the existence of strategy-proof rules that always select core-stable partitions.
Finally, So¨nmez [19] proposes a general model of allocation of indivisible goods which
includes our coalition formation model as a special case. This author focuses on prob-
lems for which there always exist core-stable partitions. Under some assumptions on
agents’ preferences, So¨nmez [19] shows that there exist strategy-proof, individually ratio-
nal, and Pareto efficient rules only if the set of core-stable partitions is always essentially
single-valued. Takamiya [20] proves that the converse result also holds under additional
assumptions on preferences –such as strict preferences and no consumption externalities–
that are fulfilled in coalition formation problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model and basic notation. In Section 3, we present different domains of preferences over
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coalitions and the notion of minimally rich domain. In Section 4, we introduce the main
axioms while in Section 5 we present single-lapping rules and provide the characterization
results. In Section 6, we prove Theorem 2. In Section 7, we conclude by analyzing
the implications of our results for matching problems. We include the proofs of some
intermediate results and supplemental material in the Appendices.
2 Basic Notation
Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} be a society consisting of a finite set of at least 3 agents, (n ≥ 3).
We call a non-empty subset C ⊆ N a coalition. Let N denote the set of all non-empty
subsets of N . For each C ∈ N , let [C] ≡ {{i} : i ∈ C}. A collection of coalitions is
a set of coalitions Π ⊆ N that contains all singleton sets, [N ] ⊆ Π. Let σ be a partition
of N and let Σ denote the set of all partitions of N . For each i ∈ N and each σ ∈ Σ, we
denote by σi ∈ σ the coalition in σ to which i belongs.
For each i ∈ N , let Ci ≡ {C ⊆ N, i ∈ C}. That is, Ci is the set of all coalitions to
which i belongs. A preference for i, %i, is a complete order on Ci.3 For each i ∈ N ,
we denote by Di the set of all preferences for i. Note that preferences are strict. Hence,
for each i ∈ N , each %i∈ Di, and each C,C ′ ∈ Ci, we write C i C ′ to indicate that i
strictly prefers C to C ′, and C %i C ′ to indicate that either C i C ′ or C = C ′. We
assume that agents only care about the coalition they belong to, then agents’ preferences
over partitions are completely defined by their preferences over coalitions. Thus, abusing
notation, we say that for each i ∈ N , each %∈ Di, and each σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, σ is at least as
good as σ′, σ %i σ′, if and only if σi %i σ′i.
For each i ∈ N , each set of coalitions X ⊆ N with X ∩ Ci 6= ∅, and each %i∈ Di, let
top(X ,%i) be the coalition in X ∩ Ci that is ranked first according to %i.
Let D ≡ ×i∈NDi. We call %∈ D a preference profile. For each C ⊂ N , DC = ×i∈CDi ,
while for each %∈ D, %C∈ DC denotes the restriction of profile % to the preferences of
the agents in C.
Let D˜ ⊆ D, we say that D˜ is a cartesian domain if for each i ∈ N there is D˜i ⊆ Di
such that D˜ = ×i∈ND˜i.
We are interested in rules that associate a partition of the society to each profile of
agents’ preferences.
3An order is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation.
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Let D˜ ⊂ D be a cartesian domain. A (coalition formation) rule defined on the
domain D˜ is a mapping ϕ : D˜ → Σ.
Naturally, for each i ∈ N and each %∈ D˜, ϕi(%) denotes the coalition in ϕ(%) to
which i belongs.
Finally, Rϕ denotes the range of ϕ, that is, the set of feasible partitions,
Rϕ ≡ {σ ∈ Σ, such that there is %∈ D˜, ϕ(%) = σ},
while, Fϕ denotes the set of feasible coalitions,
Fϕ ≡ {C ∈ N , such that for some σ ∈ Rϕ, C ∈ σ}.
3 Restricted Domains of Preferences over Coalitions
We start by presenting two classes of preferences over coalitions – top and bottom pref-
erences– that play a crucial role in our analysis. Both domains are contained in other
domains of preferences that have been extensively analyzed in the social choice litera-
ture, namely, the domains of additively representable and separable preferences. Top and
bottom preferences are obtained by extending orders over single agents to orders over
coalitions. The basic idea behind top and bottom preferences is that each agent i divides
the society into two groups according to some order over the set of agents: the agents
that she likes and the agents she dislikes. An agent equipped with top preferences pri-
oritizes (lexicographically) joining the agents she likes the most with respect to avoiding
the agents she dislikes. On the other hand, an agent equipped with bottom preferences
prioritizes (lexicographically) avoiding the agents she dislikes the most with respect to
joining the agents she likes.
Let P be the set of all complete orders over N . For each P ∈ P , R denotes the
weak order associated to P and it is defined in the usual way. For each C ⊆ N and
each P ∈ P, max(C,P ) and min(C,P ) denote, respectively, the first-ranked and the
last-ranked agent of C according to P . Next, for each i ∈ N , each P ∈ P , and each
C ∈ Ci, let C+i (P ) ≡ {j ∈ C, s.t. j R i} , and C−i (P ) ≡ {j ∈ C s.t. i R j} . Now, de-
fine C+i (1, P ) ≡ max(C+i (P ), P ) and C−i (1, P ) ≡ min(C−i (P ), P ) . Once C+i (t, P ) and
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C−i (t, P ) are defined for some t ≥ 1, iteratively, let
C+i (t+ 1, P ) ≡ max
([
C+i (P ) \ ∪tk=1C+i (k, P )
]
, P
)
, and
C−i (t+ 1, P ) ≡ min
([
C−i (P ) \ ∪tk=1C−i (k, P )
]
, P
)
.
For each i ∈ N and each P ∈ P , the preference %i∈ Di is the top preference
associated to P by i, %i=%+i (P ) if for each two distinct coalitions C,C ′ ∈ Ci, C i C ′
if and only if
• C+i (P ) 6= C ′+i (P ) and C+i (t, P ) P C ′+i (t, P ), where t is the first integer such that
C+i (t, P ) 6= C ′+i (t, P ).
• C+i (P ) = C ′+i (P ) and C−i (t′, P ) P C ′−i (t′, P ), where t′ is the first integer such that
C−i (t
′, P ) 6= C ′−i (t′, P ).
Let i ∈ N , P ∈ P , and let C,C ′ ∈ Ci be such that C 6= C ′. When comparing the
coalitions C and C ′, if agent i is equipped with preference %+i (P ), then she focuses on
the sets of agents who are ranked above i according to P , C+i (P ) and C
′+
i (P ). First,
i compares C and C ′ on the basis of the agents who are first-ranked according to P in
C+i (P ) and C
′+
i (P ). If these agents are the same, then i compares the second-ranked
agents and so on. If C+i (P ) = C
′+
i (P ), then i turns her attention to the agents who are
ranked below i according to P , C−i (P ) and C
′−
i (P ), and applies the same lexicographic
logic, but starting from the bottom. She compares first the last ranked agents in C−i (P )
and C ′−i (P ), and she proceeds iteratively in the case that they are the same agent.
The logic behind bottom preferences mimics top preferences.
For each i ∈ N and each P ∈ P,, the preference %i∈ Di is the bottom preference
associated to P by i, %i=%−i (P ) if for each two distinct coalitions C,C ′ ∈ Ci, C i C ′
if and only if
• C−i (P ) 6= C ′−i (P ), and C−i (t, P ) P C ′−i (t, P ), where t is the first integer such that
C−i (t, P ) 6= C ′−i (t, P ).
• C−i (P ) = C ′−i (P ) and C+i (t′, P ) P C ′+i (t′, P ), where t′ is the first integer such that
C+i (t
′, P ) 6= C ′+i (t′, P ).
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Let i ∈ N , P ∈ P , and let C,C ′ ∈ Ci be such that C 6= C ′. When comparing the
coalitions C and C ′, if agent i is equipped with the preference %−i (P ), then i focuses
on the sets of agents who are ranked below i according to P , C−i (P ) and C
′−
i (P ). First,
i compares C and C ′ on the basis of the agents who are last-ranked according to P in
C−i (P ) and C
′−
i (P ). If these agents are the same, then i compares the next-to-the-last
ranked agents and so on. If C−i (P ) = C
′−
i (P ), then i turns her attention to the agents who
are ranked above i according to P , C+i (P ) and C
′+
i (P ), and applies the same lexicographic
logic, but starting from the top. First, she compares the first-ranked agents in C+i (P )
and C ′+i (P ), and she proceeds iteratively in the case that they are the same agent.
For each i ∈ N , let
D+i ≡ {%i∈ Di such that for some P ∈ P , %i=%+i (P )} ,
D−i ≡ {%i∈ Di such that for some P ∈ P , %i=%−i (P )} ,
D∗i ≡ D+i ∪ D−i and,
D∗ ≡ ×i∈ND∗i .
Let D¯ ⊆ D. We say that D¯ is minimally rich if D¯ is cartesian and D∗ ⊆ D¯.
We consider that a domain of preferences over coalitions is minimally rich if it contains
top and bottom preferences. Minimal richness also requires that the domain is cartesian.
That is, an agent’s set of admissible preferences does not depend on the preferences of
the remaining agents.
The following remark shows that in minimally rich domains, the preferences of an
agent regarding the way in which she may compare the coalition in which she stays on
her own and any two other different coalitions she may belong to are not restricted.
Remark 1. For each i ∈ N and each two distinct C, C ′ ∈ Ci \ {i}, there exist %,%′,%′′∈
D∗i such that:
{i}  C  C ′,
C ′ {i} ′ C ′, and
C ′′ C ′ ′′ {i}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It can be argued that top and bottom preferences reflect rather extreme preferences
over coalitions. However, the domains of additively representable and separable prefer-
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ences are minimally rich. These domains exclude the possibility of (negative or positive)
complementarities among the members of a coalition.
Let i ∈ N . A utility function for agent i is a mapping ui : N → R such that
ui(i) = 0. A preference for agent i, %i∈ Di is additively representable if there is a
utility function ui such that for each C,C
′ ∈ Ci, C %i C ′ if and only if
∑
c∈C ui(c) ≥∑
c′∈C′ ui(c
′). For each i ∈N, Ai denotes the set of all i’s additively representable prefer-
ences for agent i and let A ≡ ×i∈NAi.
A preference for i, %i∈ Di, is separable if for each j ∈ N and each C ∈ Ci such
that j /∈ C, {i, j} i {i} if and only if (C ∪ {j}) i C. Let Si be the set of all agent i’s
separable preferences and let S ≡ ×i∈NSi.
The following remark shows that the domain of additively representable preferences
and the domain of separable preferences are indeed minimally rich domains. Moreover,
for small societies both domains coincide with the smallest minimally rich domain.
Remark 2. Let i ∈ N .
(a) If n ≥ 4, then D∗i ⊂ Ai ⊂ Si.
(b) If n = 3, then D∗i = Ai = Si.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Axioms
This section introduces four properties that rules may satisfy. Let D˜ ⊆ D be a cartesian
domain and let ϕ : D˜ → Σ be a rule defined on D˜.
Our main axiom is an incentive constraint. A rule should never provide an incentive
for an agent to misreport her preferences. Only if a rule elicits the true preferences from
the agents the social choice will be based upon the correct information. Of course, this
property refers to the specific domain in which the rule is defined.
Strategy-Proofness. For each i ∈ N , each%∈ D˜, and each%′i∈ D˜i, ϕi(%) %i ϕi(%N\{i},%′i) .
Conversely, we say that i ∈ N manipulates ϕ if there exist %∈ D˜ and %′i∈ D˜i such that
ϕi(%N\{i},%′i) i ϕi(%).
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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that every strategy-proof rule on an un-
restricted domain either is dictatorial or its range contains only two elements.4 As we
assume that agents’ preferences over social outcomes are restricted to depend only on
the coalitions they are members of and we focus on minimally rich domains, the negative
consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem do not apply to our framework.
We also consider a minimal participation constraint. Agents should not prefer to stay
on their own rather than to belong to the coalition that the rule assigns them.
Individual Rationality. For each i ∈ N and each %∈ D˜, ϕi(%) %i {i}.
Note that, for every individually rational rule, its set of feasible allocations is a collec-
tion of coalitions.
We consider rules such that whenever a change in an agent’s preference does not
change the coalition she is assigned to, then the assignment for the remaining agents does
not change.
Non-Bossiness. For each i ∈ N , each %∈ D˜, and each %′i∈ D˜i, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%′i)
implies ϕ(%) = ϕ(%N\{i},%′i).
We can interpret non-bossiness as a collusion-proof or bribe-proof condition. Imagine
that there exists a transferable private good and that agents preferences over coalitions
and private good allocations are lexicographic. Agents focus first on the coalition they are
assigned, and then in the private good allocation. A violation of non-bossiness implies
a possibility of collusion because an agent might have incentives to misrepresent her
preferences in exchange for a positive transfer of the private good from those who benefit
from the change in her preference report.
We also introduce a minimal flexibility condition on the range of the rule. We assume
that the range of a rule is determined by the set of feasible coalitions.
Flexibility. For each σ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∈ Σ, Ct ∈ Fϕ for each t = 1, . . . ,m, implies
σ ∈ Rϕ.
4A rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ is dictatorial if there is i ∈ N (a dictator) such that for each %∈ D¯,
ϕi(%) = top(Fϕ,%i) .
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Flexibility can be interpreted also as a minimal requirement of efficiency. Flexibility
means that any two disjoint feasible coalitions are mutually compatible. Hence, it implies
that the range of the rule is completely determined by the set of feasible coalitions.
However, flexibility does not implies onto-ness.5 That is, it may be the case that a
flexible rule does not admit every conceivable coalition as feasible. On the other hand,
with flexibility we rule out some coalition formation problems. For instance, any rule
defined in a four-agent society, in which every couple of agents is a feasible coalitions but
partitions containing two couples are not admissible would violate flexibility.
Finally, we introduce a weak version of efficiency. This notion of efficiency for coalition
formation problems is introduced in Pa´pai [15].
Pareto efficiency. For each %∈ D˜, there is no σ ∈ Σ such that for each C ∈ σ, C ∈ Fϕ,
and for every i ∈ N , σi %i ϕi(%), and for some j ∈ N , σj j ϕj(%).
Note that Pareto efficiency is a version of efficiency restricted to the range of the rule.
It is clear that Pareto efficiency implies flexibility, but it does not implies that every
coalition is feasible.
5 Characterization Results
In this section we analyze the implications of the axioms listed above over rules defined
on rich domains. First, we introduce additional notation due to Pa´pai [15]. This author
proposes a property over sets of coalitions – the single-lapping property– that ensures the
existence of a unique core-stable partition for every preference profile.6 We make use of
this property to define a class of rules.
A collection of coalitions Π satisfies the single-lapping property if
Condition (a): For each C,C ′ ∈ Π, C 6= C ′ implies #(C ∩ C ′) ≤ 1.
Condition (b): For each {C1, . . . , Cm} ⊆ Π with m ≥ 3 and for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
#(Ct∩Ct+1) ≥ 1 (where m+1 = 1), there is i ∈ N such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
Ct ∩ Ct+1 = {i}.
5A rule ϕ : D˜ → Σ satisfies onto-ness if Fϕ = N .
6Given a preference profile %∈ D and a collection of coalitions Π ⊆ N , the partition σ ∈ Σ is
core-stable if there is no C ∈ Π such that for each j ∈ C, C j σj .
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Condition (a) states that if there is an overlap between any two coalitions in the
collection, there cannot be more than one agent who is member of these two coalitions.
Condition (b) is a non-cycle condition. It requires that if a set of coalitions in the collection
form a cycle in which every two neighbor coalitions have a common member, then all these
coalitions have the same common member.
The following remark presents a prominent property of single-lapping collections of
coalitions. For every single-lapping collection of coalitions and for every preference profile,
there is a coalition in the collection such that all its members think that this coalition is
the best coalition in the collection.
Remark 3 (Theorem 1, Pa´pai [15].). Let Π be a single-lapping collection of coalitions.
For each %∈ D there is C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C, C = top(Π,%i).
Remark 3 implies that for every single-lapping collection of coalitions and every pref-
erence profile there is a unique core-stable partition of the society. Pa´pai [15] presents
the following algorithm to find such partition.
For each %∈ D and each single-lapping collection of coalitions Π ⊂ N , the core-
stable partition associated to Π at profile %, σ¯Π(%), can be identified by the
following algorithm:
Algorithm: Pa´pai [15]. Let %∈ D and let Π be a single-lapping collection of coalitions.
Find C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C, top(Π,%i) = C . As Π is single-lapping,
such coalition exists. Note that there may be several such coalitions, and all these
coalitions are disjoint. Let
Π(1,%) ≡ Π,
MΠ(1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ C, top(Π,%i) = C}
TΠ(1,%) ≡ ∪C∈MΠ(1,%)C
Hence, MΠ(1,%) denotes the set of all the coalitions that are formed in this first
stage and TΠ(1,%) denotes the set of agents that are matched in the first stage.
Once Π(t,%), MΠ(t,%), and TΠ(t,%) are defined for some t ≥ 1, let,
Π(t+ 1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that C ∩ TΠ(t,%) = {∅}},
MΠ(t+ 1,%) ≡ {C ∈ Π(t+ 1,%) such that for each i ∈ C, top(Π(t+ 1,%),%i) = C} and,
TΠ(t+ 1,%) ≡ ∪C∈MΠ(1,%)∪...∪MΠ(t+1,%)C.
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Note that, for each t = 1, . . . ,m, Π(t,%) ⊂ Π, Π(t,%) is a collection of coalitions
for the reduced society N \ TΠ(t,%). Moreover, Π(t,%) satisfies the single-lapping
property. Let m ≤ n be the smallest integer such that TΠ(m,%) = N . Then, the
algorithm identifies a unique partition,
σ¯Π(%) ≡ {C ∈ Π such that for some t ≤ m, C ∈MΠ(t,%)}.
For each single-lapping collection of coalitions and each preference profile there is a
unique core-stable partition. Thus, each single-lapping collection of coalitions defines a
unique rule.
Let D˜ ⊆ D be a cartesian domain of preferences and let ϕ be a rule defined on D˜.
The rule ϕ is a single-lapping rule if there is a single-lapping collection of coalitions
Π such that for each %∈ D˜, ϕ(%) = σ¯Π(%).
Theorem 3 in Pa´pai [15] shows that, given a fixed single-lapping collection of coalitions
Π, if agents are restricted to prefer standing on their own to any other coalition C /∈ Π,
then the single-lapping rule associated to Π is the unique rule that satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. Note that for every single-lapping
rule, for each preference profile there is always a feasible coalition such that all its members
think that it is their best preferred feasible coalition. Thus, single-lapping rules clearly
satisfy strategy-proofness in any minimally rich domain. In fact, single-lapping rules also
satisfy individual rationality, non-bossiness, flexibility, and Pareto efficiency.
Theorem 1. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ is single-lapping,
then ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, flexibility, and
Pareto efficiency.
Proof. Let Fϕ = Π. Because ϕ is a single-lapping rule, Π is a single-lapping collection
of coalitions. Let us check that ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness. Let %∈ D¯. For each i ∈
TΠ(1,%), ϕi(%) = top(Π,%i). Thus, agents in TΠ(1,%) cannot manipulate. Moreover,
by the definition of single-lapping rule for each %′∈ D¯ such that for each i ∈ TΠ(1,%)
%i=%′i, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%′). Now, let j ∈ TΠ(2,%). If there exists C ∈ Π such that
C j ϕj(%), then there is i ∈ TΠ(1,%)) such that i ∈ C. Note that for each %′j∈ D¯j
and each i ∈ TΠ(1,%), ϕi(%N\{j},%′j) = TΠ(1,%). Thus, ϕj(%) %j ϕj(%N\{j},%′j) and j
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cannot manipulate. Repeating iteratively the argument with the remaining steps of the
algorithm, we obtain that no agent can manipulate.
Let us check that ϕ satisfies individual rationality. By the definition of single-lapping
rule, for each i ∈ N and each %∈ D¯, there is t ≤ n such that ϕi(%) ∈ MΠ(t,%). Note
that {i} ∈ Π(t,%). By the definition of single-lapping rule, ϕi(%) ≡ top(Π(t,%),%i).
Thus, ϕi(%) %i {i}, which proves individual rationality.
Let us check that ϕ satisfies non-bossiness. Let i ∈ N , %∈ D¯, and %′i∈ D¯i be such that
ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%′i). Let i ∈ TΠ(t,%). Because ϕ is a single-lapping rule, for each
j ∈ ∪t′≤tTΠ(t′,%), ϕj(%) = ϕj(%N\{i},%′i). Moreover, because ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%′i),
for each k ∈ ∪t′≥tTΠ(t′,%), we have ϕk(%) = ϕk(%N\{i},%′i) . Then, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′), which
proves non-bossiness.
Let us check that ϕ satisfies flexibility. Let σ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for
each t = 1, . . . , k, Ct ∈ Π. Let %∈ D¯ be such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m and each i ∈ Ct,
top(N ,%i) = Ct. By the definition of single-lapping rule, ϕ(%) = σ and σ ∈ Rϕ. Thus,
ϕ satisfies flexibility.
Finally, Pareto efficiency follows immediately from the definition of single-lapping
rule. Note that for each i ∈ N and each %∈ D¯ there is t ≤ n such that ϕi(%) =
top(Π(t,%),%i).
Note that we only need to assume that the domain of the rule is minimally rich in
proving flexibility. The proof of the remaining axioms is domain independent. Note also
that single-lapping rules satisfy strategy-proofness even in the unrestricted domain of
preferences over coalitions D. By restricting the set of feasible coalitions, single-lapping
rules eliminate agents’ opportunities for profitable misrepresentation of preferences. Our
next result is, in some way, more surprising. In every minimally rich domain, single-
lapping rules are the only rules that satisfy our list of axioms. Hence, reducing the set of
admissible preferences for the agents does not allow for additional rules.
Theorem 2. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility then ϕ is a single-lapping
rule.
We present the proof of Theorem 2 in the next section. The intuition runs as follows.
For every rule that satisfies our axioms, when the members of a feasible coalition of
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individuals agree that this coalition is the best preferred feasible coalition, this coalition
is formed. Then, it remains to check that the set of feasible coalitions satisfies the single-
lapping property. This step is far from being immediate and constitutes the bulk of the
proof. The analysis is relatively simple for three agents societies. We use an induction
argument to extend the result to arbitrary societies.
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we obtain the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 3. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. A rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-
lapping rule.
Theorem 3 shows that only rules that select the unique core-stable partition given an
initial set of feasible coalition satisfy our list of axioms. Hence, Theorem 3 provides further
evidence on the relation between the concepts of strategy-proofness and unique core-
stability. This relation has been already presented in previous works as So¨nmez [19] and
Pa´pai [15].7 provides several novelties with respect to previous results. We do not impose
any restrictions either on preferences or on feasible coalitions that ensure the existence
of core-stable partitions. Instead, we obtain that the rule selects the unique core stable
partition directly from our axioms. This fact allows us to obtain a characterization result
that applies to every kind of coalition formation problem instead of impossibility results.
In addition, our results apply to very restricted domains of preferences as the smallest
minimally rich domain. Finally, we do not use Pareto efficiency in the characterization,
instead we use two axioms, non-bossiness and flexibility, that are not included in the
definition of core-stability.
The domains of additively representable and separable preferences are minimally rich
domains. Hence, we obtain the following corollaries to Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. A rule ϕ : A → Σ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and flexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping rule.
Corollary 2. A rule ϕ : S → Σ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and flexibility if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping rule.
Corollaries 1 and 2 are in sharp contrast with the results of Barbera`, et al. [5].
These authors analyze problems in which the founding members of a society select new
7The line of research that investigates the existence of strategy-proof rules in core selecting organiza-
tions was initiated by Ledyard [14].
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members for the society and their preferences over candidates are additively representable
(or separable). They show that for those coalition formation problems, strategy-proof rules
can be decomposed in a set of yes/no rules, one for each possible candidate. There are
two differences between their framework and ours. Barbera`, et al. [5] do not consider
the preferences of the candidates as relevant for the social choice. Moreover, they do not
consider the restrictions imposed by individual rationality, that we consider indispensable
for the analysis of coalition formation rules.
In the light of Theorems 2 and 3, it may seem that the main message of this article
is rather negative. Single-lapping rules make compatible our four axioms, but at the
cost of severely restricting the set of feasible coalitions. However, there are many real-
life applications in which the restrictions implied by single-lapping are likely to arise.
Indeed, Pa´pai [15] shows that single-lapping collections of coalitions can be associated to
a non-directed graph endowed with a tree structure. Tree structures are characteristic to
many hierarchical societies in which only members of adjacent levels in the hierarchy are
connected and can form a coalition.8 Example 1 describes one such possibility.
Example 1. Let N = {a1, . . . , a10} be a transnational firm formed by 10 units. The firm
is organized hierarchically. Unit a1 is the central management unit. Units a2, a3, and
a4 represent three different area branches that are under direct supervision of a1 and that
supervise their respective local branches. Units a5 and a6 are under the supervision of
a2, units a7 and a8 are under the supervision of a3, and units a9 and a10 are under the
supervision of a4.
Put Figure 1 about here.
The different units are involved in research activities and may act on its own or it
may initiate two-unit joint research ventures, but a joint venture is admissible only if both
units are directly communicated in the hierarchy. Hence, the set of feasible coalitions is
Π∗ = [N ]∪{{a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a1, a4}, {a2, a5}, {a2, a6}, {a3, a7}, {a3, a8}, {a4, a9}, {a4, a10}}.
Note that Π∗ is a single-lapping collection of coalitions. Assuming that the each unit man-
ager´s preferences over research ventures only depend on the unit that her unit actually
joins, it would be natural to use the single-lapping rule associated to Π∗ for decentralizing
the research venture formation process.
8See Demange [8] and [9] for more on the relation of hierarchical structures and coalitional stability.
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Theorems 2 and 3 are tight if there are at least four agents. When there are only three
agents, flexibility is directly implied by individual rationality. The following examples
show the independence of the axioms for any arbitrary minimally rich domain D¯.9
Example 2 (Strategy-proofness). Let N = {i, j, k}. For each %∈ D¯, let
IRi(%) ≡ {C ∈ Ci, such that for each j ∈ C,C %j {j}} .
Let ϕ−SP be such that for each %∈ D¯, ϕ−SPi (%) ≡ top(IRi(%),%i) and for each j /∈
top(IRi(%),%i), ϕ−SPj (%) ≡ {j}. Note that ϕ−SP satisfies individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and flexibility. However, ϕ−SP violates strategy-proofness.10
Example 3 (Individual rationality). Let N = {i, j, k}. Let ϕ−IR be such that for each
%∈ D¯, ϕ−IRi (%) = top(N ,%i), and for each j /∈ top(N ,%i), ϕ−IRj (%) = {j}. The
rule ϕ−IR is dictatorial. Note that ϕ−IR satisfies strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
flexibility. However, ϕ−IR violates individual rationality.
Example 4 (Non-Bossiness). Let N = {i, j, k}. Let ϕ−NB be such that for each %∈ D¯,
ϕ−NB (%) =

{i, j, k} if for each i′ ∈ N, {i, j, k} %i′ {i′} ,
({i, j} , {k}) if {i, j} i {i}, {i, j} j {j} and top(N ,%k) = {k},
[N ] otherwise.
Note that ϕ−NB satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and flexibility. How-
ever, ϕ−NB violates non-bossiness.11
Example 5 (Flexibility). Let N = {i, j, k, l}. Let ϕ−F be such that for each %∈ D¯,
ϕ−F (%) =
{
({i, j}, {k, l}) if for each m ∈ N, ({i, j}, {k, l}) %m [N ] ,
[N ] otherwise.
Note that ϕ−F satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. How-
ever, ϕ−F violates flexibility.
9The following examples are stated in three and four-agent societies. These examples can be easily
generalized to arbitrary societies. This point is discussed in Appendix B.
10In order to check that ϕ−SP is manipulable, let N = {i, j, k}, %∈ D∗, and %′j∈ D∗j be such that
{i, j} i {i, j, k} i {i}, {i, j, k} j {i, j} j {j, k} j {j}, and {i, k} k {i, j, k} k {k}; while
{j, k} ′j {i, j, k} ′j {j}. Note that ϕ−SP (%) = ({i, j}, {k}), while ϕ−SP (%N\{j},%′j) = {i, j, k}. Then,
ϕ−SPj (%N\{j},%′j) j ϕ−SPj (%).
11In order to check that ϕ−NB violates non-bossiness, let %∈ D∗, %′k∈ D∗k be such that {i, j} i {i},
{i, j} j {j}, top(N ,%k) = {k}, while {j, k} ′k {k} ′k {i, j, k}. Note that ϕ(%) = ({i, j}, {k}) and
ϕ(%N\{k},%′k) = ({i}, {j}, {k}).
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At this point, we clarify the relation between strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
Pareto efficiency. In many frameworks, strategy-proofness and non-bossiness directly
imply Pareto efficiency. However, this is not the case in our framework.12 On the other
hand, although we cannot find a general and straight-forward argument that shows that
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, imply non-bossiness, it
turns out that the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 are also valid (with minimal
modifications) if we use Pareto efficiency instead of non-bossiness and flexibility. Hence,
we can state the following theorem that parallels Theorem 3.13
Theorem 4. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. A rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency if and only if ϕ is a single-lapping
rule.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4 shows that, when applied to strategy-proof and individually rational rules,
non-bossiness and flexibility are equivalent to Pareto efficiency. While sometimes Pareto
efficiency may seem a more palatable axiom, we think that in coalition formation prob-
lems, non-bossiness is also easily justifiable. We have chosen to use non-bossiness instead
of Pareto efficiency because Pareto efficiency is part of the definition of core-stability.
We feel that by introducing individual rationality–no single agent prefers stay on her own
rather than accepting the coalition proposed by the rule– together with Pareto efficiency
12Consider a society formed by four agents N = {i, j, k, l}. Define the rule ϕ¯ in the domain of separable
preferences. Let ϕ¯ : S → Σ. Agents i and j are the founding members of a club and they are always
together. Then, for each %∈ S, {i} ∈ ϕ¯j(%), {j} ∈ ϕ¯i(%). Preferences of agents k and l are irrelevant
for the social choice. Agent k enters the club if i likes agent k. Thus, {k} ∈ ϕ¯i(%) if {i, k} %i {i}. Agent
l enters the club if j likes l. Thus, {l} ∈ ϕ¯j(%) if {j, l} %l {j}. The rule ϕ¯ satisfies strategy-proofness,
non-bossiness, and flexibility. However, ϕ¯ violates individual rationality and Pareto efficiency. Let
%∈ S be such that {i, j, k} i {i, k} i {i, j} i {i} i C for each C ∈ Ci \ ({i, j, k}, {i, k}, {i, j}, {i}) ,
{i, j, l} j {j, l} j {i, j} j {j} j C ′ for each C ′ ∈ Cj \ ({i, j, l}, {j, l}, {i, j}, {j}) , {k} = top(N ,%k),
and {l} = top(N ,%l). Basically, i likes j and k but strongly dislikes l, j likes i and l and strongly
dislikes k, whereas k and l would rather stay alone. Note that ϕ¯(%) = {i, j, k, l}, but for each i′ ∈ N ,
({i, j}, {k}, {l}) i′ ϕ¯(%).
13Note that the examples that show the independence of the axioms in Theorem 3 are also valid to
show the independence of the axioms in Theorem 4. It is easy to check that ϕ−SP , ϕ−IR, and ϕ−F satisfy
Pareto efficiency. However, ϕ−NB violates Pareto efficiency.
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–all the members of the society do not prefer an alternative partition to the partition pro-
posed by the rule–, we would introduce too many ingredients of the core in our framework.
By focusing on non-bossiness, we make a cleaner connection between the non-cooperative
concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of core-stability.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 2, several remarks are in order.
First, we relate our results to those by So¨nmez [19] and Takamiya [20]. So¨nmez [19]
proves that for coalition formation problems in which there is always a core-stable par-
tition, there is a rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto
efficiency if the set of core-stable partitions is always essentially single-valued. Actually,
Takamiya [20] proves that the converse result is also true for coalition formation prob-
lems as the problems we analyze here. The main difference between our framework and
So¨nmez’s one relies on the domain of preferences over coalitions. So¨nmez [19] assumes the
existence of certain preferences that need not exist in a minimally rich domain. Basically,
in So¨nmez’s framework for each i ∈ N , and each C ∈ (Fϕ ∩ Ci), if there is an admissible
preference %i such that C i {i}, then there is another admissible preference %′i such
that for each C ′ ∈ (Fϕ ∩ Ci) \ {i}, C ′ %′i C if and only if C ′ %i C, while C %i C ′ if
and only if C %′i C ′ and C %′i {i} %′i C ′. There are minimally rich domains, namely
the domain of additively representable preferences, for which such preferences are not
admissible. Let i, j, k ∈ N , and assume {i, j}, {i, k}, {i, j, k} ∈ Fϕ. Let %i∈ Ai be such
that {i, j, k} i {i, j}  {i, k}  {i}, but there is no %′i∈ Ai such that {i, j, k} ′i {i},
{i} ′i {i, j}, and {i} ′i {i, k}.
Finally, we conclude addressing the issue of whether Theorems 3 and 4 hold for domains
of preferences strictly contained in D∗. As D∗ consists of the union of the domains
of top and bottom preferences, it is natural to check whether there exist non-single-
lapping rules that satisfy our axioms in those domains. It turns out that new possibilities
arise in both domains. The domain of top preferences is included in the domain of top-
responsive preferences proposed by Alcalde and Revilla [2]. These authors provide an
algorithm – the top-covering algorithm– that always select a core-stable partition of the
society if agents’ preferences are top-responsive. In addition, their top-covering algorithm
defines a Pareto efficient rule that satisfies our axioms in the domain of top preferences
×i∈ND+i . On the other hand, the rule ϕ−SP presented in Example 2 satisfies strategy-
proofness when defined in the domain of bottom preferences ×i∈ND−i .14 Hence, we can
14See Appendix B for additional details.
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also interpret Theorems 3 and 4 as minimal domain results. The smallest minimally
rich domain D∗ is a minimal domain for which the single-lapping rules are the unique
rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and either non-bossiness and
flexibility, or Pareto efficiency. If we want to use rules for tighter domains (properly
included on D∗), then new possibilities arise.
6 Proof of Theorem 2
We begin this section by introducing some properties that are implied by our axioms.
These properties incorporate the idea that a rule cannot be against the preferences of
the members of the society. When there is a partition that each agent considers at least
as good as every other partition, a rule should choose that best-preferred partition. A
stronger requirement would be that whenever the members of a coalition consider this
coalition as the best coalition, this coalition should form, independently of the preferences
of the remaining agents in society. Of course, the following axioms refer to rules defined
on a minimally rich domain D¯.
Unanimity. Let σ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m , Ct ∈ Fϕ .
For each %∈ D¯, each t = 1, . . . ,m , and each i ∈ Ct, top(Fϕ,%i) = Ct implies ϕ(%) = σ .
Top-Coalition. Let C ∈ Fϕ and %∈ D¯. If for each i ∈ C, top(Fϕ,%i) = C , then for
each i ∈ C, ϕi (%) = C.
It is clear that top-coalition and Pareto efficiency imply unanimity. However, Pareto
efficiency and top-coalition are logically independent. Note that top-coalition is a prop-
erty of rules. Banerjee et al. [3] use the term top-coalition to name a property of preference
profiles. These authors say that a preference profile satisfies the top-coalition property if
for every group of agents V ⊆ N there is a coalition C ⊆ V that is mutually the best
coalitions for all the members of C. Basically, our top-coalition implies that at a pref-
erence profile that satisfies Banerjee et al.’s top-coalition property, then the rule selects
a partition in which all the coalitions such that all their members consider as the best
feasible coalition are formed.
Lemma 1. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
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proofness, non-bossiness, and flexibility, then ϕ satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Let σ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∈ Σ be such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, Ct ∈ Fϕ. Let
%∈ D¯ be such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m and each i ∈ Ct, top(Fϕ,%i) = Ct . By
flexibility, σ ∈ Rϕ. Then, there is %′∈ D¯, such that ϕ(%′) = σ. Let i ∈ N . Let
%′′∈ D¯ be such that %′′i=%i while for each j ∈ N \ {i}, %′′j=%′j. By strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%′) = top(Fϕ,%i) . Then, ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) = ϕi(%′) = top(Fϕ,%i) . By
non-bossiness, ϕ(%′N\{i},%i) = ϕ(%′). Repeating the argument as many times as neces-
sary, we obtain ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′).
Lemma 2. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility, then ϕ satisfies top-coalition.
Proof. Let C ∈ Fϕ. Let %∈ D¯ be such that for each i ∈ C, top(Fϕ,%i) = C. If
#C = 1, then the result follows from individual rationality. If C = N , then the result
is immediate by unanimity. Let %′∈ D¯ be such that for each i ∈ C, top(Fϕ,%′i) = C,
for each C ′ ∈ Ci such that there is j ∈ (C ′ \ C), {i} i C ′, and for each k /∈ C,
%k=%′k.15 By individual rationality, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%′) ⊆ C. Let %′′∈ A be such
that for each i ∈ C, %′i=%′′i while for each k ∈ (N \ C), ϕk(%′) = top(Fϕ,%′′k) . By
strategy-proofness, ϕk(%′N\{k},%′′k) = ϕk(%′) . By non-bossiness, ϕ(%′N\{k},%′′k) = ϕ(%′) .
Repeating the arguments for each k ∈ (N \ C), ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%′′). By unanimity, for each
i ∈ C, ϕi(%′′) = C. Then, ϕi(%′) = C. Finally, let i ∈ C. By strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%′) . Then, ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) = C. Repeating the argument as many
times as necessary, we obtain that for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C.
In the following lemma we prove that agents’ preferences over infeasible coalitions are
irrelevant for the social choice.
Lemma 3. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness and non-bossiness, then, for each %,%′∈ D¯ such that for each i ∈ N , and each
C,C ′ ∈ (Fϕ ∩ Ci), C i C ′ if and only if C ′i C ′, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′).
15Note that ×i∈ND−i ⊂ D¯. Thus, %′C∈ D¯C .
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Proof. Let %,%′∈ D¯ be such that for each i ∈ N , and each C,C ′ ∈ (Fϕ ∩ Ci), C i C ′
if and only if C ′i C ′. Let i ∈ N . By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%N\{i},%′i) %′i ϕi(%) and
ϕi(%) %i ϕi(%N\{i},%′i) . Because for each C,C ′ ∈ (Fϕ ∩ Ci), C i C ′ if and only if
C ′i C ′, we have ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%′i). By non-bossiness, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%N\{i},%′i).
Repeating the argument as many times as necessary, we get ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′).
The following lemma presents the crucial step in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility, then Fϕ satisfies the single-
lapping property.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of agents. We first focus on three-agent
societies. Then, we extend the result to arbitrary societies. We use extensively throughout
the proof the fact that D∗ ⊆ D¯.
Claim 1. Let n = 3, then Fϕ satisfies Condition (a) of the single-lapping property.
Proof. Let N = {i, j, k}. Assume to the contrary that Fϕ does not satisfy Condition (a).
Then, there are C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ such that #(C ∩ C ′) ≥ 2. We have two cases.
Case (1.1): Fϕ = {{i}, {j}, {k}, {i, j}, {i, j, k}}.
Let %¯k ∈ D∗k be such that {i, j, k}¯k{i, k}¯k{j, k}¯k{k}. Let the rule ϕ¯{i,j} : D¯{i,j} → Σ
be such that for each %{i,j}∈ D¯{i,j}, ϕ¯{i,j}(%{i,j}) ≡ ϕ(%{i,j}, %¯k). By ϕ’s strategy-
proofness, ϕ¯{i,j} satisfies strategy-proofness. By ϕ’s top-coalition,
Rϕ¯
{i,j}
= {({i}, {j}, {k}), ({i, j}, {k}), {i, j, k}}.
By Remark 1, agent i and agent j’s preferences over the partitions in Rϕ¯
{i,j}
are unre-
stricted. Hence, ϕ¯{i,j} satisfies strategy-proofness, its range contains three elements, and
agents’ preferences over the elements of the range are unrestricted. Then, by the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕ¯{i,j} is dictatorial. Assume that i is the dictator for ϕ¯{i,j}. Let
%{i,j}∈ D∗{i,j} be such that {i, j, k} i {i, j} i {i} and {j} j {i, j} j {i, j, k}. Then,
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ϕ(%{i,j}, %¯k) = {i, j, k} , but {j} j ϕj(%), which violates individual rationality, a con-
tradiction.
Case (1.2) {{i}, {j}, {k}, {i, j}, {j, k}, {i, j, k}} ⊆ Fϕ.
Let %1∈ D∗ be such that,
%1i : %1j : %1k:
{i, j} {i, j} {j, k}
{i} {j} {i, j, k}
{i, j, k} {i, j, k} {k}
{i, k} {j, k} {i, k}
By top-coalition, ϕ (%1) = ({i, j}, {k}).
Let %2∈ D∗ be such that %2N\{i}=%1N\{i} and {i, j, k} %2i {i, j} %2i {i, k} %i2 {i}.
By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%2) %2i ϕi(%1). Then, ϕi(%2) is either {i, j, k} or {i, j}. Be-
cause {j} 2j {i, j, k}, by individual rationality, ϕi(%2) = {i, j}. Then, by non-bossiness,
ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1) .
Let %3∈ D∗ be such that %3N\{j}=%2N\{j} and {i, j} %3j {i, j, k} %3j {j}. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj (%3) %3j ϕj(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = {i, j}. By non-bossiness, ϕ (%3) = ϕ (%2).
Now, let %4∈ D∗ be such that %4N\{i}=%3N\{i} and {i, k} %4i {i, j, k} %4i {i}. Then,
%4i : %4j : %4k:
{i, k} {i, j} {j, k}
{i, j, k} {i, j, k} {i, j, k}
{i} {j} {k}
{i, j} {j, k} {i, k}
By individual rationality, ϕi(%4) 6= {i, j}, ϕk(%4) 6= {i, k}, and ϕj(%4) 6= {j, k}. By
strategy-proofness, ϕi(%3) %3i ϕ(%4). Note that, {i, j, k} 3i ϕ (%3) . Then, ϕ (%4) =
({i}, {j}, {k}).
Let %5∈ D∗ be such that %5i=%4i , {j, k} 5j {j} 5j {i, j, k} %5j {i, j} , and {i, j, k} %5k
{j, k} %5k {i, k} %5k {k}. By top-coalition, ϕk(%5N\{k},%4k) = {j, k} . By strategy-proofness,
ϕk(%5) %5k {j, k} . Because {j} 5j {i, j, k} , by individual rationality, ϕ (%5) = ({i}, {j, k}) .
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Let %6∈ D∗ be such that %6N\{j}=%5N\{j} and {i, j, k} %6j {j, k} %6j {i, j} %6j {j}. Note
that, by unanimity, ϕ(%6N\{i},%3i ) = {i, j, k} . Hence, by strategy-proofness, ϕi(%6) %i {i, j, k} .
Then, ϕ(%6) = {i, j, k} .
Finally, let %7∈ D∗ be such that %7N\{j}=%6N\{j} and %7j=%4j . Then
%7i : %7j : %7k:
{i, k} {i, j} {i, j, k}
{i, j, k} {i, j, k} {j, k}
{i} {j} {i, k}
{i, j} {j, k} {k}
Note that the only difference between %4 and %7 consists of k’s preference. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj (%7) %7j ϕj (%6) = {i, j, k}. By individual rationality, if j ∈ ϕi(%7), then
ϕi(%7) = {i, j, k}. Hence, ϕ (%7) = {i, j, k}. However, ϕk (%7) 4k ϕk (%4), which violates
strategy-proofness, a contradiction.
Cases (1.1) and (1.2) exhaust (up to a relabelling the agents) all the possibilities.
Then, Fϕ satisfies Condition (a), which concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
Claim 2. Let n = 3, then Fϕ satisfies Condition (b) of the single-lapping property.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that Fϕ does not satisfy Condition (b). Then, there is
a list of coalitions {C1, . . . , Cm} ⊂ Fϕ, with m ≥ 3 and m + 1 = 1 such that for each
t = 1, . . . ,m, #(Ct ∩ Ct+1) ≥ 1 and for no i ∈ N , (Ct ∩ Ct+1) = {i}. By Claim 1, ϕ
satisfies Condition (a). Then, we have Fϕ = {{i}, {j}, {k}, {i, j}, {j, k}, {i, k}}. Thus,
for each %∈ D¯, there is i′ ∈ {i, j, k} such that
ϕi′(%) = {i′} (*)
Let %∈ D∗ be such that {i, j} i {i, k} i {i},16 {j, k} j {i, j} j {j}, and
{i, k} k {j, k} k {k} . Let P ∈ P be such that k P i P j, and let %′i∈ D∗i be
%′i=%−i (P ) . Because top(Fϕ,%′i) = top(Fϕ,%k) = {i, k} , by top-coalition, we have that
ϕ(%N\{i},%′i) = ({i, k}, {j}) . By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%) i ϕ(%N\{i},%′i) . Then, we
16Note that by Lemma 3, we only need specify agents’ preferences over feasible coalitions.
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have that ϕi(%) 6= {i} . Using parallel arguments, we get ϕj(%) 6= {j} and ϕk(%) 6= {k} ,
which contradicts (*) and concludes the proof of Claim 2. 
Now, we extend the result to arbitrary finite societies.
Induction Step. There is m ≥ 3 such that for n = m, if the n-agent rule ϕ satisfies
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility, then Fϕ satisfies
the single-lapping property. We prove that this is true for n = m+ 1.
By Claims 1 and 2, the induction hypothesis is true for m = 3. Let n = m+1. Assume
that ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility.
First, we prove two facts.
Fact 1. For each C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ such that C ∪ C ′ 6= N , #(C ∩ C ′) = 1.
Proof. Let C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ be such that (C ∪ C ′) 6= N . Let j ∈ N \ (C ∪ C ′). Let %¯j ∈ D∗j
be such that for each C ∈ Cj, C 6= {j}, {j}¯jC. Let ΣN\{j} denote all the partitions
of the reduced society N \ {j}. Define the rule ϕ¯N\{j} : D¯N\{j} → ΣN\{j} in such a way
that for each %N\{j}∈ D¯N\{j}, (ϕ¯N\{j}(%N\{j}), {j}) ≡ ϕ(%N\{j}, %¯j). By ϕ’s strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility, ϕ¯N\{j} satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. By the induction hypoth-
esis, F ϕ¯
N\{j}
satisfies the single-lapping property. By ϕ’s flexibility, C,C ′ ∈ F ϕ¯N\{j} , then
#(C ∩ C ′) = 1. 
Similar arguments apply to prove the following fact.
Fact 2. For each {C1, . . . , Cm} ⊆ Π with m ≥ 3, ∪mt=1Ct 6= N , and for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
#(Ct ∩ Ct+1) ≥ 1 (where m + 1 = 1), there is i ∈ N such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
Ct ∩ Ct+1 = {i}.
Claim 1′. Fϕ satisfies Condition (a).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there are C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ such that (C ∪ C ′) = N , and
#(C ∩ C ′) ≥ 2. We replicate the arguments of three-agent societies. There are three
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cases:
Case (1.0′) Let C,C ′ 6= N .
By Fact 1, either Fϕ = {[N ], C, C ′}, or Fϕ = {[N ], C, C ′, N}. Let %¯N\(C∩C′) ∈ D∗N\(C∩C′)
be such that for each j ∈ (C \ C ′), top(Fϕ,%j) = C, whereas for each k ∈ (C ′ \ C),
top(Fϕ,%k) = C ′. Define the rule ϕ¯C∩C
′
: D¯C∩C′ → Σ in such a way that for each
%C∩C′∈ D¯C∩C′ , ϕ¯C∩C′(%C∩C′) ≡ ϕ(%C∩C′ , %¯N\(C∩C′)). Because ϕ is strategy-proof, ϕ¯C∩C
′
is strategy-proof. Moreover, by top-coalition, Rϕ¯
C∩C′
= {[N ], (C, [C ′ \ C]), (C ′, [C \ C ′])}.
By Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in (C∩C ′) over the partitions in Rϕ¯C∩C′ are not
restricted. By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕC∩C
′
is dictatorial. Let i ∈ (C ∩C ′)
be a dictator for ϕC∩C
′
. Let %C∩C′∈ D∗C∩C′ be such that top(F ϕ¯C∩C
′
,%i) = C ′, and for
each j ∈ (C∩C ′)\{i}, top(F ϕ¯C∩C′ ,%j) = {j}. Then, ϕ(%C∩C′ , %¯N\(C∪C′)) = (C ′, [C\C ′]),
which violates ϕ’s individual rationality, a contradiction.
Case (1.1′) Let C ′ = N , and for no j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \C and C ′′ ⊂ N with C ′′ ∈ Fϕ
such that {j, k} ⊆ C ′′.
Let %N\C∈ D∗N\C be such that for each j ∈ (N \C), top(Fϕ, ¯j) = N . Define now the rule
ϕ¯C : D¯C → Σ in the following way. For each %C∈ D¯∗, ϕ¯C(C) ≡ ϕ(%C , %¯N\C). Clearly,
ϕ¯C satisfies strategy-proofness. Moreover, by top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, Fϕ∩Ci = F ϕ¯C .
Hence, by Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in C over partitions in Rϕ¯
C
are not
restricted. By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕ¯C is dictatorial, which, by an already
familiar argument, violates ϕ’s individual rationality, a contradiction.
Case (1.2′) Let C ′ = N , and for some j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \ C and C ′′ ⊂ N with
C ′′ ∈ Fϕ such that {j, k} ⊆ C ′′.
Note first that, by Fact 1, for each C ′′ ∈ (Fϕ \ N), #(C ∩ C ′′) ≤ 1. Moreover, by
Fact 2, there is no cycle of three coalitions in Fϕ that does not involve the grand coalition
N .
Let C,N ∈ Fϕ, let j ∈ C be such that for some T ⊆ N \ C, T ∪ {j} ∈ Fϕ. Let
C¯ ≡ C \ {j}. Let T ′ ∈ Fϕ \ {C,N}. By Fact 1, there is no i ∈ C \ {j}, such that
{i, j} ⊆ T ′. By Fact 2, there is no k ∈ T such that {i, k} ⊆ T ′.
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Let %1∈ D∗ be such that for each i ∈ C¯, there is P 1i ∈ P with j = max(N,P 1i ),
N+i (P ) = C, and %1i=%−i (P 1i ), for j there is P 1j ∈ P with N+j (P ) = C, and %1j=%−j (P 1j ),
while for each k ∈ N \ C, there is P 1k ∈ P with N+k (P ) = {j} ∪ {k}, and %1k=%+k (P 1k ).
By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%1) = C.
Next, let %2∈ D∗ be such that %1
N\C¯=%2N\C¯ , while for each i ∈ C¯ there is P 2i ∈
P such that j = max(N,P 2i ), N+i (P 2i ) = N , and %2i=%+i (P 2i ). Note that for each
i ∈ C¯, N = top(Fϕ,%2i ) and C = top(Fϕ \ N,%2i ). Let i ∈ C¯, by strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%1N\{i},%2i ) %2i ϕi(%1) = C. By individual rationality, ϕj(%1N\{i},%2i ) 6= N . Then,
ϕi(%1N\{i},%2i ) = C. By non-bossiness, ϕ(%1N\{i},%2i ) = ϕ(%1). Repeating the same
argument iteratively with each i ∈ C¯, we get ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1).
Let%3∈ D∗ be such that%2N\{j}=%3N\{j} and%3j=%+j (P 1j ). Note that top(Fϕ,%3j) = C .
By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%3) %3j ϕ(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = C, and by non-bossiness,
ϕ(%3) = ϕ(%2).
Let %4∈ D∗ be such that %3
N\C¯=%4N\C¯ , while for each i ∈ C¯ there is P 4i ∈ P such that
for some k¯ ∈ T , max(N,P 4i ) = k¯, N+i (P 4i ) = T ∪{i}, and %4i=%+i (P 4i ). Note that by Fact
2 and our assumptions on Fϕ, for each i ∈ C¯, top(Fϕ, P 4i ) = N , and for each C ∈ Fϕ∩Ci,
if C 6= N , then {i} %4i C. Let i ∈ C¯, by strategy-proofness, ϕi(%3) %3i ϕi(%3N\{i},%4i ).
Hence, ϕi(%3N\{i},%4i ) 6= N . Repeating the argument for each i ∈ C¯, we obtain that
ϕ(%4) 6= N . Clearly, for each i ∈ C¯, N is the only coalition in Fϕ that is preferred to
staying on her own. On the other hand, for agent j, the coalitions that are preferred to
staying alone include some member of C¯. Finally, each agent k ∈ N \ C requires the
presence of agent j in order to consider a coalition better than staying on her own. Then,
by individual rationality, we have that ϕ(%4) = [N ].
Consider now the profile %5∈ D∗, such that for each i ∈ C¯, %5i=%4i , for some P 5j ∈ P
such that there is k¯ ∈ T , with max(N,P 5j ) = k¯ and N+j (P 5j ) = N , and %5j=%+j (P 5j ),
while for each k ∈ N \ C, there is P 5k ∈ P such that j = max(N,P 5k ), N = N+k (P 5k ), and
%5k=%+k (P 5k ). By unanimity, ϕ(%5) = N .
Finally, let %6∈ D∗, be such that for each %6C=%4C , while %6N\C=%5N\C . That is,
we only change agent j’s preferences with respect to the previous profile. By strategy-
proofness, ϕj(%6) %6 ϕj(%5) = N . By individual rationality, for each i ∈ C¯, if j ∈ ϕi(%6) ,
then ϕi(%6) = N . Hence, ϕ(%6) = N . Clearly, %6 only differs from %4 in the preferences
of the agents who belong to N \ C. Let k ∈ N \ T . By strategy-proofness, we have that
ϕk(%6N\{k},%4k) %4k ϕk(%6) = N . Then, j ∈ ϕk(%6N\{k},%4k). By individual rationality,
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there is i ∈ C¯ such that i ∈ ϕj(%6N\{k},%4k). By Fact 1 and our assumptions over Fϕ,
ϕ(%6N\{k},%4k) = N . Repeating the argument as many times as necessary, we get that
ϕ(%4) = N , a contradiction.
Cases (1.0′), (1.1′) and (1.2′) exhaust all the possibilities. Then, this suffices to prove
that Fϕ satisfies Condition (a). 
Claim 2′. Fϕ satisfies Condition (b).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that ϕ does not satisfy Condition (b). Then, there is
a list of coalitions {C1, . . . , Cm}, with m ≥ 3 such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, (m+ 1 = 1),
(Ct ∩ Ct+1) 6= {∅} , and there is no i ∈ N such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, {i} = (Ct ∩ Ct+1) .
Because we have just proved that Fϕ satisfies Condition (a) of the single-lapping prop-
erty, we have that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, #(Ct ∩ Ct+1) = 1. By Fact 2, ∪mt=1Ct = N .
Moreover, Fϕ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∪ [N ] .
For each t = 1, . . . ,m, let it ≡ (Ct ∩ Ct+1). Note that for each t = 1, . . . ,m and
each j ∈ (Ct \ {it−1, it}) , Fϕ ∩ Cj = {Ct, {j}}. On the other hand, for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
Fϕ ∩ Cit = {Ct, Ct+1, {it}}. Then, by Remark 1, minimal richness of the domain of
preferences does not introduce any restriction on how the agents may order the different
coalitions they may belong to. From now on, we only describe agents’ preferences over
feasible coalitions.
For each t = 1, . . . ,m, let it ≡ (Ct ∩ Ct+1). Let %∈ D¯ be such that for each
t = 1, . . . ,m and each j ∈ (Ct \ {it−1, it}), top(Fϕ,%j) = Ct, and for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
top(Fϕ,%it) = Ct+1, and Ct it {it}. Let t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let %′it∈ D¯it be such
that top(Fϕ,%′it) = Ct. By top-coalition, ϕit(%N\{it},%′it) = Ct . By strategy-proofness,
ϕit(%) %it ϕit(%N\{it},%′it) . Thus, for each t = 1, . . . ,m; ϕit(%) %it Ct.
Assume first that m is odd. Then, there is t′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that ϕit′ (%) = {it′},
a contradiction with ϕit(%) %it Ct for each t = 1, . . . ,m.
Assume now that m is even. Without loss of generality, assume that for each t odd,
ϕit(%) = Ct+1 and for each t′ even, ϕit′ (%) = Ct′ . Let t¯ be even. Let Pt¯ ∈ P be such that
N+t¯ (Pt¯) = Ct¯+1. Let %′it¯=%
−
t¯ (Pt¯) ∈ D∗it¯ . Note that top(Fϕ,%′it¯) = Ct¯+1 and for each
T * Ct¯+1, {it¯} ′it¯ T . By individual rationality, ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) 6= Ct¯ . Let %′it¯−1∈ D∗it¯−1
be such that top(Fϕ,%′it¯−1) = Ct¯−1 . By top-coalition, ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯−1,it¯},%
′
{it¯−1,it¯}) = Ct¯−1 .
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By strategy-proofness, we have that ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯},%′{it¯}) %it¯−1 ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯−1,it¯},%
′
{it¯−1,it¯}) .
Then, ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct¯−1, and ϕit¯−2(%N\{it¯},%
′
it¯
) = Ct¯−1 . Repeating the argument
as many times as necessary, for each t odd, ϕit(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct , while for each t
′ even
ϕit′ (%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct′+1, and ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%
′
it¯
) = Ct¯+1. Then, we get ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) it¯ ϕit¯(%) ,
which violates strategy-proofness, and suffices to prove Claim 2′ and Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness,
and flexibility. By Lemma 2, ϕ satisfies top-coalition. Let %∈ D¯. By Lemma 4, Fϕ
satisfies the single-lapping property. Thus, there is C ∈ Fϕ such that for each i ∈ C,
top(Fϕ,%i) = C . By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C. Moreover, by top-coalition,
for each %′∈ D¯ such that %C=%′C , for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%′) = C. Let ΣN\C denote the
set of all possible partitions of the reduced society N \ C. Define now the restricted
social choice function ϕ¯N\C : D¯N\C → ΣN\C , in such a way that for each %N\C∈ D¯N\C ,
(ϕ¯N\C(%N\C), C) ≡ ϕ(%N\C ,%C). Clearly, ϕ¯N\C satisfies strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. Moreover, F ϕ¯
N\C
= {C ′ ∈ Fϕ, C ∩ C ′ = {∅}},
and F ϕ¯
N\C
satisfies the single-lapping property. Repeating the same arguments as many
times as necessary, we get ϕ(%) = σ¯Fϕ(%).
7 Implications for Matching Problems
In this section we present several applications of our results for matching problems. Many
interesting matching problems, as marriage problems and college admission problems are
characterized by initial restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions. However, we see that
these initial restrictions are not going to suffice to obtain rules that satisfy our sets of
axioms. In this section, we investigate the additional restrictions that single-lapping rules
introduce in matching problems.
7.1 Marriage and Roommate Problems
Marriage problems are a special class of coalition formation problems. In a marriage
problem, agents are divided in two disjoint groups.17 These two sets are usually interpreted
17See Roth and Sotomayor [16] for a comprehensive exposition of modeling and analysis of such prob-
lems.
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as a set of men and a set of women. Each man has preferences over the couples he may
form with any woman and remaining single, and each woman has preferences over the
couples she may form with any man and remaining single. The set of feasible coalitions
consists of all single agents and all the couples formed by a man and a woman.
Let M,W ⊂ N be such that M ∩W = ∅, and M ∪W = N , and define
Π(M,W ) ≡ {(m,w) ⊂ N,m ∈M,w ∈ W} ∪ [N ].
Let D¯ ⊆ D be a minimally rich domain. The rule ϕm : D¯ → Σ is a (M,W )-marriage
rule if Fϕ
m ⊆ Π(M,W ). We say that the (M,W )-marriage rule ϕm has full-range if
Fϕ
m
= Π(M,W ).
From Theorems 3 and 4, we immediately obtain the following corollary.18
Corollary 3. Let M,W ⊂ N be such that M ∩W = ∅, and M ∪W = N , and let D¯ be
a minimally rich domain.
(a) A (M,W )-marriage rule ϕm satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-
bossiness, and flexibility if and only if ϕm is a single-lapping rule.
(b) A (M,W )-marriage rule ϕm satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and
Pareto efficiency if and only if ϕm is a single-lapping rule.
(c) If #M ≥ 2 and #W ≥ 2, then there is no full-range, strategy-proof, and individually
rational (M,W )-marriage rule that satisfies either non-bossiness and flexibility, or
Pareto efficiency.
Note that if #M = 1 or #W = 1, every (M,W )-marriage rule is a single-lapping rule.
Clearly, if #M ≥ 2 and #W ≥ 2, then the set of feasible coalitions of every full-range
(M,W )-marriage rule does not satisfy the single-lapping property. In this case, we can
construct (M,W )-marriage rules that satisfy our axioms if we do not allow some couples
to form.
Example 6. Let N = {i, j, k, l}. Let M = {i, j} and W = {k, l}. Consider the collection
of coalitions Πm = {{i, k}, {i, l}, {j, k}} ∪ [N ]. Note that Πm satisfies the single-lapping
18Pa´pai [15] has proved part (b) of the Corollary. Alcalde and Barbera` [1] and So¨nmez [19] have
proven the last implication of part (c). Note that minimal richness of the domain does not introduce any
restriction in the way agents may compare couples.
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property. Hence, the single-lapping rule associated to Πm is a (M,W )-marriage rule that
satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, flexibility and Pareto
efficiency. However, the couple {j, l} is not feasible.
A generalization of marriage problems is known as roommate problems. There is a set
of agents that have to be organized in couples (or in groups of a given cardinality). For
instance, there are a number of rooms available and we can assign either 1 or 2 persons
to each room. (Some room may remain empty.)
Let q ∈ N be such that 2 ≤ q ≤ n. We interpret the integer q as the number of beds
available in each room. For each integer q, let Πq ≡ {C ∈ N , #C ≤ q}.
Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. We say that the rule ϕq : D¯ → Σ is a q-roommate
rule if Fϕ
q ⊆ Πq. We say that the q-roommate rule ϕq has full range if Fϕq = Πq.
It is not difficult to see that for every q, a q-roommate rule, its set of feasible coalitions
violates Condition (b) of the single-lapping property.19 Hence, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 4. Let q ∈ N be such that 2 ≤ q ≤ n, and let D¯ be a minimally rich domain.
(a) A q-roommate rule ϕq satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness,
and flexibility if and only if ϕq is a single-lapping rule.
(b) A q-marriage rule ϕq satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto
efficiency if and only if ϕq is a single-lapping rule.
(c) There is no full-range, strategy-proof, and individually rational q-roommate rule that
satisfies either non-bossiness and flexibility, or Pareto efficiency.
7.2 College Admission Problems when Students Care about Class-
mates
Another generalization of the marriage problem is known as the college admission problem.
There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of colleges C, and a set of new students S.
Each college c ∈ C has a number of free slots and may admit up to a quota of qc new
students. Colleges have preferences over cohorts of new students. New students have
19For instance, let N = {1, 2, 3} and q = 2. Clearly, for every full-range 2-roommate rule ϕq, Πq =
{C ∈ N , #C ≤ 2} = [N ] ∪ {1, 2} ∪ {1, 3} ∪ {2, 3}.
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preferences over colleges and classmates. A coalition is feasible if either is a singleton or
it contains exactly one college and the number of students assigned to each college is not
larger than its respective quota qc.
20
Let C, S ⊂ N be such that C ∩ S = ∅, and C ∪ S = N . The set C represent a set of
colleges, and S a cohort of new students. Let {qc}c∈C ∈ N#C denote the list of quotas of
available slots in each college. Let Π(C,S,{qC}) ≡ {(c, Sc), c ∈ C, Sc ⊆ S, and #Sc ≤ qc}∪
[N ].
Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. The rule ϕc : D¯ → Σ is a (C, S, {qc})-college
admission rule if Fϕ
c ⊆ Π(C,S,{qC}). We say that the (C, S, {qc})-college admission rule
ϕc has full-range if Fϕ
c
= Π(C,S,{qC}).
In a similar fashion as for marriage and roommate problems, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 5. Let C, S ⊂ N be such that C ∩ S = ∅, and C ∪ S = N and let D¯ be a
minimally rich domain.
(a) A (C, S, {qc})-college admission rule ϕm satisfies strategy-proofness, individual ratio-
nality, non-bossiness, and flexibility if and only if ϕm is a single-lapping rule.
(b) A (C, S, {qc})-college admission rule ϕm satisfies strategy-proofness, individual ratio-
nality, and Pareto efficiency if and only if ϕm is a single-lapping rule.
(c) If #S ≥ 2 and either #C ≥ 2 or if C = {c}, qc ≥ 2, then there is no full-range,
strategy-proof, and individually rational (C, S, {qc})-college admission rule that sat-
isfies either non-bossiness and flexibility, or Pareto efficiency.
So¨nmez [18] shows that if students only care about the college they attend and do
not care about their classmates, and each college has an unlimited number of available
slots, then there is always a unique core-stable partition. Moreover the rule that selects
that partition satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency.
Of course, his result does not contradicts our Theorem 4, since in So¨nmez’s framework
it is assumed that students do not care about their classmates. However, the different
20When students care about the identity of their classmates, Dutta and Masso´ [11] have shown that
core-stable partitions may fail to exist. This is not the case if students only care about the college they
attend. See Roth and Sotomayor [16] for further details on the existence of core-stable partitions in
college-admission problems.
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domains of preferences that we analyze explain that we cannot obtain impossibility results
as corollaries to Theorems 3 and 4 in So¨nmez’s framework.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix A: Proofs of Remark 1 and Remark 2
Proof of Remark 1. Let i ∈ N , and C,C ′ ∈ Ci be such that C 6= C ′.
1. First, we prove that there exists %∈ D∗i such that {i}  C  C ′. We consider two
cases:
(a) There exists an agent x ∈ C ′ \ C. Let P ∈ P be such that N+i (P ) = {i} and
x = min(N,P ) . Then, {i} −i (P ) C −i (P ) C ′.
(b) C ′ ⊂ C. Let P ′ ∈ P be such that N+i (P ′) = (C \ C ′) ∪ {i}. Then, we have
that {i} −i (P ′) C −i (P ′) C ′ .
2. Now, we prove that there exists %′∈ D∗i such that C ′ {i} ′ C ′. We have to
consider two cases:
(a) There exists an agent x ∈ C \ C ′. Let P ∈ P be such that N+i (P ) = {i, x}.
Then, C +i (P ) {i} +i (P ) C ′ .
(b) C ⊂ C ′. Let P ′ ∈ P be such thatN+i (P ′) = C. Then C −i (P ′) {i} −i (P ′) C ′ .
3. Finally, we check there exists %′′∈ D∗i such that C ′′ C ′ ′′ {i}. We have to
consider two cases:
(a) There exists an agent x ∈ C \ C ′. Let P ∈ P be such that N+i (P ) = N and
x = max(N,P ). Then, C +i (P ) C ′ +i (P ) {i} .
(b) C ⊂ C ′. Let P ′ ∈ P be such thatN+i (P ′) = C. Then, C +i (P ′) C ′ +i (P ′) {i} .
Proof of Remark 2. First, we check that additive preferences are separable. Let i ∈ N ,
and %i∈ Ai. Then , let the utility function ui be such that for each C,C ′ ∈ Ci, C %i C ′
if and only if
∑
j∈C ui(j) ≥
∑
j′∈C′ ui(j
′). Let j ∈ N \ {i}, and let C ∈ Ci be such that
j /∈ C. Note that if {i, j} i {i}, then ui(j) > 0. This implies that
(∑
k∈C ui(k)
)
+ui(j) >∑
k∈C ui(k). On the other hand, if
(∑
k∈C ui(k)
)
+ ui(j) >
∑
k∈C ui(k), then ui(j) > 0.
Hence, %i∈ Si.
34
Next, we prove the inclusion D∗i ⊂ Ai. We check that for each i ∈ N and each %∈ D∗i ,
we can construct a utility function ui that rationalizes % as an additively representable
preference.
Let%i∈ Di be such that for some P ∈ P , %i=%+i (P ). Let t∗ ≡ {t ∈ N : i = N+i (t, P )} ,
and t¯ ≡ n−t∗. For each j ∈ N+i (P )\{i}, if j = N+i (k, P ), then let ui(j) = nn−k, ui(i) = 0,
and for each j′ ∈ N−i (P ) \ {i}, if j′ = N−i (k′, P ), then let ui(j′) = −(nt¯−k). It is clear
that for each C,C ′ ∈ Ci, C %+i (P )C ′ if and only if
∑
c∈C ui(c) ≥
∑
c′∈C′ ui(c
′). Thus,
%+i (P ) ∈ Ai.
Now, let %′i∈ Di be such %′i=%−i (P ). For each j ∈ N+i (P ) \ {i}, if j = N+i (k, P ),
then let u′i(j) = n
t∗−k−1, u′i(i) = 0, whereas for each j
′ ∈ N−i (P ) \ {i}, if j′ = N−i (k′, P ) ,
then let u′i(j
′) = −(nn−k′). It is clear that for each C,C ′ ∈ Ci, C %−i (P )C ′ if and only if∑
c∈C u
′
i(c) ≥
∑
c′∈C′ u
′
i(c
′). Thus, %−i (P ) ∈ Ai.
In order to check that the inclusion is proper when n ≥ 4, assume that {i, j, k, l} ⊆ N .
Let the preference %i∈ Ai be such that
{i, j, k} i {i, j} i {i, k} i {i, j, k, l} i {i} i {i, j, l}  {i, k, l} i {i, l}.
The preference %i can be obtained from a utility function ui such that ui(i) = 0, ui(j) = 3,
ui(k) = 2, and ui(l) = −4. However, there is no P ∈ P such that the restriction of either
%+i (P ) or %−i (P ) to the coalitions formed by {i, j, k, l} coincides with %i. Note that if
for some P ∈ P , {i, j} +i (P ) {i}, then {i, j, l} +i (P ) {i}. On the other hand, if for
some P ′ ∈ P, {i} −i (P ′) {i, l}, then {i} −i (P ′) {i, j, k, l}. Finally, let %′i∈ S be such
that
{i, j, k} i {i, k} i {i, j} i {i, j, k, l} i {i, j, l}  {i, k, l} i {i} i {i, l}.
It is not difficult to check that %′i /∈ Ai, because for each %′′i∈ Ai, if {i, k} ′′i {i, j}, then
{i, k, l} ′′i {i, j, l}.
The proof of (b) is just a matter of checking. Let N = {i, j, k}, D∗i , Ai and Si consist
of the following eight preferences:
%1i : %2i : %31: %4i : %5i : %6i : %7i : %8i :
{i, j, k} {i, j, k} {i, j} {i, j} {i, k} {i, k} {i} {i}
{i, j} {i, k} {i, j, k} {i} {i, j, k} {i} {i, j} {i, k}
{i, k} {i, j} {i} {i, j, k} {i} {i, j, k} {i, k} {i, j}
{i} {i} {i, k} {i, k} {i, j} {i, j} {i, j, k} {i, j, k}
Note that %1i ,%2i ,%7i ,%8i∈ D+i ∩ D−i , while %3i ,%5i∈ D+i \ D−i , and %4i ,%6i∈ D−i \ D+i .
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8.2 Appendix B: Supplemental Material. For the Convenience
of the Referee Only
In this appendix we present additional material that may help referee’s work. First we
present the proofs of Theorem 4 (that replicates the proof of Theorem 3) and Remark
3 (that can be found in Pa´pai [15]). Next, we check the robustness of the examples
that show the independence of our axioms presented in section 5. Finally, we discuss
the possibility of constructing rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality,
non-bossiness, and flexibility in the domains of top and bottom preferences.
8.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4 and Remark 3
Before proving Theorem 4, we introduce some intermediate results.
Lemma 5. Let N = {i, j, k} and let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ
satisfies individual rationality and Pareto efficiency, then ϕ satisfies non-bossiness.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there is a rule ϕ that satisfies strategy-proofness,
individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, but violates non-bossiness. Then, with-
out loss of generality, there are %∈ D¯, %′i∈ D¯i such that ϕ(%) = ({i}, {j, k}) and
ϕ(%N\{i},%′i) = [N ] . By individual rationality, {j, k} j {j} and {j, k} k {k}, which
contradicts Pareto efficiency of ϕ at profile (%N\{i},%′i).
Lemma 6. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, then ϕ satisfies top-coalition.
Proof. Let C ∈ Fϕ. Let %∈ D¯ be such that for each i ∈ C, top(Fϕ,%i) = C. If #C = 1,
then the result follows from individual rationality. If C = N , then the result is immediate
by Pareto efficiency. Hence, assume that C ( N . Let i ∈ C, and let Pi ∈ P be such
that N+i (Pi) = C. Let %∈ D¯ be such that for each i ∈ C, %′i=%−i (Pi), and for each
j ∈ N \ C, %′j=%j. By individual rationality, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%′) ⊆ C. Hence, by
Pareto efficiency, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%′) = C. Next, let i ∈ C. By strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%′) = C . Then, ϕi(%′N\{i},%i) = C . Repeating the argument, with
the remaining agents i ∈ C, we obtain that for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C.
The following lemma parallels Lemma 4 of the text.
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Lemma 7. Let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. If a rule ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, then Fϕ satisfies the single-lapping
property.
Proof. The proof replicates the arguments of Lemma 4. First, we prove the result for
three-agent societies and then we use an induction argument to extend the result to
arbitrary societies.
Assume that n = 3. Note first that Pareto efficiency implies flexibility. Because n = 3,
by Lemma 5, individual rationality and Pareto efficiency imply non-bossiness. Then, ϕ
satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. By the
arguments in Claims 1 and 2 of the proof of Lemma 4, Fϕ satisfies the single-lapping
property.
Induction Step. There is m ≥ 3 such that for n = m, if the n-agent rule ϕ satis-
fies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, then Fϕ satisfies the
single-lapping property. We prove that this is true for n = m+ 1.
The induction hypothesis is true for m = 3. Let n = m + 1. Assume that ϕ satisfies
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. First, we prove two facts.
Fact 1′. For each C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ such that C ∪ C ′ 6= N , #(C ∩ C ′) = 1.
Proof. Let C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ be such that (C ∪ C ′) 6= N . Let j ∈ N \ (C ∪ C ′). Let %¯j ∈ D¯j
be such that for each C ∈ Cj, C 6= {j}, {j}¯jC. Let ΣN\{j} denote all the partitions
of the reduced society N \ {j}. Define the rule ϕ¯N\{j} : D¯N\{j} → ΣN\{j} in such a way
that for each %N\{j}∈ D¯N\{j}, (ϕ¯N\{j}(%N\{j}), {j}) ≡ ϕ(%N\{j}, %¯j). By ϕ’s strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, ϕ¯N\{j} satisfies strategy-proofness,
individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. By the induction hypothesis, F ϕ¯
N\{j}
satisfies
the single-lapping property. By ϕ’s flexibility, C,C ′ ∈ F ϕ¯N\{j} , then #(C ∩ C ′) = 1. 
The same arguments apply to prove the following fact.
Fact 2′. For each {C1, . . . , Cm} ⊆ Π with m ≥ 3, ∪mt=1Ct 6= N , and for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
#(Ct ∩ Ct+1) ≥ 1 (where m + 1 = 1), there is i ∈ N such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
Ct ∩ Ct+1 = {i}.
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Claim 1′′. Fϕ satisfies Condition (a).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there are C,C ′ ∈ Fϕ such that (C ∪ C ′) = N , and
#(C ∩ C ′) ≥ 2. There are three cases. Note that in the proof of Cases (1.0′) and (1, 1′),
of Claim 1′ of Lemma 4, we have used top-coalition but not non-bossiness. Then, the
arguments there apply without any modification here. We include the whole proof for the
sake of completeness.
Case (1.0′′) Let C,C ′ 6= N .
By Fact 1′, either Fϕ = {[N ], C, C ′}, or Fϕ = {[N ], C, C ′, N}. Let %¯N\(C∩C′) ∈ D¯N\(C∩C′)
be such that for each j ∈ (C \ C ′), top(Fϕ,%j) = C, whereas for each k ∈ (C ′ \ C),
top(Fϕ,%k) = C ′. Define the rule ϕ¯C∩C
′
: D¯C∩C′ → Σ in such a way that for each
%C∩C′∈ D¯C∩C′ , ϕ¯C∩C′(%C∩C′) ≡ ϕ(%C∩C′ , %¯N\(C∩C′)). Because ϕ is strategy-proof, ϕ¯C∩C
′
is strategy-proof. Moreover, by top-coalition, Rϕ¯
C∩C′
= {[N ], (C, [C ′ \ C]), (C ′, [C \ C ′])}.
By Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in (C∩C ′) over the partitions in Rϕ¯C∩C′ are not
restricted. By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕC∩C
′
is dictatorial. Let i ∈ (C ∩C ′)
be a dictator for ϕC∩C
′
. Let %C∩C′∈ D¯C∩C′ be such that top(F ϕ¯C∩C
′
,%i) = C ′, and for
each j ∈ (C∩C ′)\{i}, top(F ϕ¯C∩C′ ,%j) = {j}. Then, ϕ(%C∩C′ , %¯N\(C∪C′)) = (C ′, [C\C ′]),
which violates ϕ’s individual rationality.
Case (1.1′′) Let C ′ = N , and for no j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \C and C ′′ ⊂ N with C ′′ ∈ Fϕ
such that {j, k} ⊆ C ′′.
Let %N\C∈ D¯N\C be such that for each j ∈ (N \ C), top(Fϕ, ¯j) = N . Define now the
rule ϕ¯C : D¯C → Σ in the following way. For each %C∈ D¯C , ϕ¯C(C) ≡ ϕ(%C , %¯N\C).
Clearly, ϕ¯C satisfies strategy-proofness. Moreover, by top-coalition, for each i ∈ C,
Fϕ ∩ Ci = F ϕ¯C ∩ Ci. By Remark 1, the preferences of the agents in C over partitions
in Rϕ¯
C
are free. Thus, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, ϕ¯C is dictatorial, which,
by an already familiar argument, violates ϕ’s individual rationality.
Case (1.2′′) Let C ′ = N , and for some j ∈ C there is k ∈ N \ C and C ′′ ⊂ N with
C ′′ ∈ Fϕ such that {j, k} ⊆ C ′′.
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Note first that, by Fact 1′, for each C ′′ ∈ (Fϕ \ N), #(C ∩ C ′′) ≤ 1. Moreover, by Fact
2′, there is no cycle of three coalitions in Fϕ that does not involve the grand coalition N .
Let C,N ∈ Fϕ, let j ∈ C be such that for some T ⊆ N \ C, T ∪ {j} ∈ Fϕ. Let
C¯ ≡ C \ {j}. Let T ′ ∈ Fϕ \ {C,N}. By Fact 1, there is no i ∈ C¯, such that {i, j} ⊆ T ′.
By Fact 2, there is no k ∈ T such that {i, k} ⊆ T ′.
Let %1∈ D∗ be such that for each i ∈ C¯, there is P 1i ∈ P with j = max(N,P 1i ),
N+i (P ) = C, and %1i=%−i (P 1i ), for j there is P 1j ∈ P with N+j (P ) = C, and %1j=%−j (P 1j ),
while for each k ∈ N \ C, there is P 1k ∈ P with N+k (P ) = {j} ∪ {k}, and %1k=%+k (P 1k ).
By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%1) = C.
Next, let %2∈ D∗ be such that %1
N\C¯=%2N\C¯ , while for each i ∈ C¯ there is P 2i ∈
P such that j = max(N,P 2i ), N+i (P 2i ) = N , and %2i=%+i (P 2i ). Note that for each
i ∈ C¯, N = top(Fϕ,%2i ) and C = top(Fϕ \ N,%2i ). Let i ∈ C¯, by strategy-proofness,
ϕi(%1N\{i},%2i ) %2i ϕi(%1) = C. By individual rationality, ϕj(%1N\{i},%2i ) 6= N . Then,
ϕi(%1N\{i},%2i ) = C. Repeating the same argument iteratively with each i ∈ C¯, we get
that for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%2) = ϕi(%1).
Let%3∈ D∗ be such that%2N\{j}=%3N\{j} and%3j=%+j (P 1j ). Note that top(Fϕ,%3j) = C .
By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%3) %3j ϕ(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = C, and for each i ∈ c,
ϕi(%3) = ϕi(%2).
Let %4∈ D∗ be such that %3
N\C¯=%4N\C¯ , while for each i ∈ C¯ there is P 4i ∈ P such that
for some k¯ ∈ T , max(N,P 4i ) = k¯, N+i (P 4i ) = T ∪{i}, and %4i=%+i (P 4i ). Note that by Fact
2 and our assumptions on Fϕ, for each i ∈ C¯, top(Fϕ, P 4i ) = N , and for each C ∈ Fϕ∩Ci,
if C 6= N , then {i} %4i C. Let i ∈ C¯, by strategy-proofness, ϕi(%3) %3i ϕi(%3N\{i},%4i ).
Hence, ϕi(%3N\{i},%4i ) 6= N . Repeating the argument for each i ∈ C¯, we obtain that
ϕ(%4) 6= N . Note that for each i ∈ C¯, N is the only coalition in Fϕ that is preferred to
staying on her own. On the other hand, agent j prefers a coalition C rather than on her
own only if C includes some member of C¯. Finally, each agent k ∈ N \ C requires the
presence of agent j in order to consider a coalition better than staying on her own. Then,
by individual rationality, we have that ϕ(%4) = [N ], which contradicts Pareto efficiency,
because for each i ∈ N , N i {i}.
Cases (1.0′′), (1.1′′) and (1.2′′) exhaust all the possibilities. Then, this suffices to prove
that Fϕ satisfies Condition (a). 
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Claim 2′′. Fϕ satisfies Condition (b).
Proof. Note that in the proof of Claim 2′ of Lemma 4, we do not use non-bossiness. Hence
the arguments there apply without any modification here. We include the proof for the
sake of completeness.
Assume, to the contrary, that ϕ does not satisfy Condition (b). Then, there is a
list of coalitions {C1, . . . , Cm}, with m ≥ 3 such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, (m+ 1 = 1),
(Ct ∩ Ct+1) 6= {∅} , and there is no i ∈ N such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m, {i} = (Ct ∩ Ct+1) .
As we have just proved that Fϕ satisfies Condition (a) of the single-lapping prop-
erty, for each t = 1, . . . ,m, #(Ct ∩ Ct+1) = 1. By Fact 2, ∪mt=1Ct = N . Moreover,
Fϕ = {C1, . . . , Cm} ∪ [N ] .
For each t = 1, . . . ,m, let it ≡ (Ct ∩ Ct+1). Note that for each t = 1, . . . ,m and
each j ∈ (Ct \ {it−1, it}) , Fϕ ∩ Cj = {Ct, {j}}. On the other hand, for each t = 1, . . . ,m,
Fϕ ∩ Cit = {Ct, Ct+1, {it}}. Then, by Remark 1, minimal richness of the domain of
preferences does not introduce any restriction on how the agents may order the different
coalitions they may belong to.
Let%∈ D∗ be such that for each t = 1, . . . ,m and each j ∈ (Ct\{it−1, it}), top(Fϕ,%j) = Ct ,
and for each t = 1, . . . ,m, top(Fϕ,%it) = Ct+1, and Ct it {it}. By top-coalition and the
repeated application of strategy-proofness, for each t = 1, . . . ,m; ϕit(%) %it Ct.
Assume first that m is odd. Then, there is t′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that ϕit′ (%) = {it′},
a contradiction with ϕit(%) %it Ct for each t = 1, . . . ,m.
Assume now that m is even. Without loss of generality, assume that for each t odd,
ϕit(%) = Ct+1 and for each t′ even, ϕit′ (%) = Ct′ . Let t¯ be even. Let Pt¯ ∈ P be such that
N+t¯ (Pt¯) = Ct¯+1. Let %′it¯=%
−
t¯ (Pt¯) ∈ D∗it¯ . Note that top(Fϕ,%′it¯) = Ct¯+1 and for each
T * Ct¯+1, {it¯} ′it¯ T . By individual rationality, ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) 6= Ct¯ . Let %′it¯−1∈ D∗it¯−1
be such that top(Fϕ,%′it¯−1) = Ct¯−1 . By top-coalition, ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯−1,it¯},%
′
{it¯−1,it¯}) = Ct¯−1 .
By strategy-proofness, we have that ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯},%′{it¯}) %it¯−1 ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯−1,it¯},%
′
{it¯−1,it¯}) .
Then, ϕit¯−1(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct¯−1, and ϕit¯−2(%N\{it¯},%
′
it¯
) = Ct¯−1 . Repeating the argument
as many times as necessary, for each t odd, ϕit(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct , while for each t
′ even
ϕit′ (%N\{it¯},%′it¯) = Ct′+1, and ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%
′
it¯
) = Ct¯+1. Then, we get ϕit¯(%N\{it¯},%′it¯) it¯ ϕit¯(%) ,
which violates strategy-proofness, a contradiction. This suffices to prove that Fϕ satisfies
Condition (b) of the single-lapping property and concludes the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 1, every single-lapping rule satisfies strategy-proofness,
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individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. Thus, we focus on the converse result. Let
ϕ : D¯ → Σ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. By
Lemma 6, ϕ satisfies top-coalition. Let %∈ D¯. By Lemma 7, Fϕ satisfies the single-
lapping property. Then, there is C ∈ Fϕ such that for each i ∈ C, top(Fϕ,%i) = C .
By top-coalition, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C. Moreover, again by top-coalition, for
each %′∈ D¯ such that %C=%′C , for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%′) = C. Let ΣN\C denote the set
of all possible partitions of the reduced society N \ C. Define now the restricted so-
cial choice function ϕ¯N\C : D¯N\C → ΣN\C , in such a way that for each %N\C∈ D¯N\C ,
(ϕ¯N\C(%N\C), C) ≡ ϕ(%N\C ,%C). Clearly, ϕ¯N\C satisfies strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, and Pareto efficiency. Moreover, F ϕ¯
N\C
= {C ′ ∈ Fϕ, C ∩ C ′ = {∅}}, and
F ϕ¯
N\C
satisfies the single-lapping property. Repeating the same arguments as many times
as necessary, we get ϕ(%) = σ¯Fϕ(%).
Proof of Remark 3, Theorem 1, Pa´pai [15]. Let Π be a single-lapping collection
of coalitions and let %∈ D. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is no C ∈ Π
such that for each i ∈ C, C = top(Π,%i). Let i ∈ N . Then [N ] ⊆ Π implies that
top(Π,%i) 6= {i}. Thus, there exists j ∈ top(Π,%i) such that top(Π,%j) j top(Π,%i).
Then, there is k ∈ top(Π,%j) such that top(Π,%k) k top(Π,%j). By condition (a) of
the single-lapping property, i 6= k. Then, there is l ∈ top(Π,%k) such that top(Π,%l) l
top(Π,%k). By condition (a) of the single-lapping property, j 6= l. By condition (b) of
the single-lapping property, i 6= l. Repeating the argument in the same fashion, we get a
contradiction, since there is a finite number of agents.
8.2.2 On the Robustness of Examples 2 to 5
Examples 2, 3, and 5 can be straight-forwardly extended to societies with 4 or more agents
so we concentrate on Example 4.
We can design obtain a rule that satisfies all our axioms except non-bossiness and
Pareto efficiency, by embedding three-agent rules replicating ϕ−NB defined in Example 4
in a tree structure. The next example presents such a possibility in a four-agent society.
Example 7. Let N = {i, j, k, l} and let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. Consider the
{i, j, k}-society rule ϕ−NB : D¯N\{l} → ΣN\{l} defined in Example 4 in the main text. Next,
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let the rule ϕ∗ : D¯ → Σ be such that Fϕ∗ = Fϕ−NB ∪ {k, l} ∪ {l} and for each %∈ D¯
ϕ∗k(%) =
{
{k, l} if {k, l} l {l} and {k, l} k ϕ−NBk (%N\{l}),
ϕ−NBk (%N\{l}) otherwise,
and for each h ∈ {i, j},
ϕ∗h(%) =
{
{h} if ϕ∗k(%) = {k, l},
ϕ−NBh (%N\{l}) otherwise.
Clearly, ϕ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and flexibility, but it violates
non-bossiness and Pareto efficiency.
Finally, we want to clarify a point in which Example 5 may be misleading. Although
ϕ−F is not a single-lapping rule, Fϕ
−F
satisfies the single-lapping property. In four-agent
societies is not easy to design rules that violate flexibility and satisfy the remaining axioms
with a non-single-lapping set of feasible coalitions. However, in five-agent societies we can
find clear-cut examples showing that flexibility is indeed necessary for obtaining Lemma
4.
Example 8. Let N = {i, j, k, l,m} and let D¯ be a minimally rich domain. Let ϕ′ : D¯ → Σ
be such that Fϕ
′
= {{i, j}, {k, l,m}, {k, l}} ∪ [N ], and for each %∈ D¯:
ϕ′i(%) =
{
{i, j} if {i, j} %i {i} and {i, j} %j {j},
{i} otherwise,
and
ϕ′k(%) =

{k, l,m} if ϕi(%) = {i, j} and {k, l,m} %h {h} for each h ∈ {k, l,m},
{k, l} if ϕi(%) = {i} and {k, l} %k {k}, {k, l} %l {l},
{k} otherwise.
Clearly, ϕ′ satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, Pareto effi-
ciency, but it violates flexibility.
8.2.3 Examples of Rules for Top and Bottom Preferences
First, we analyze the relation between our work and Alcalde and Revilla [2]. More specifi-
cally, we show that top preferences are included in the domain of top responsive preferences
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presented by Alcalde and Revilla [2]. In addition, we present their top covering algorithm
and show that it implicitly defines a rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, individual ra-
tionality, non-bossiness, and flexibility in the domain of top preferences.
First, we need a piece of notation. For each C ∈ N , let C denote the set of all
non-empty subsets of C.
Let i ∈ N and %i∈ Di. The preference %i is top-responsive if for each C,C ′ ∈ Ci:
• If top(C,%) i top(C ′,%i), then C i C ′.
• If top(C,%i) = top(C ′,%i) and C ⊂ C ′, then C i C ′.
Let Dtopi denote the domain of all top responsive preferences in Di.
Lemma 8. Let i ∈ N and %∈ Di. If %i∈ D+i , then %i∈ Dtopi
Proof. Let P ∈ P be such that %i=%+i (P ). Note first that for each C ∈ Ci, top(C,%i) =
C+i (P ). Next, let C,C
′ ∈ Ci. Assume first that C+i (P ) i C ′+i (P ). As %i=%+i (P ), C i
C ′. Finally, assume that C+i (P ) = C
′+
i (P ) and C ⊂ C ′. Then, C−i (P ) ⊂ C ′−i (P ). Let t′
be the smallest integer t such that C−i (t, P ) 6= C ′−i (t, P ). Note that C−i (t′, P ) ∈ C ′−i (P ).
Then, C−i (t
′, P ) P C ′−i (t
′, P ). Hence, C i C ′.
Top-Covering Algorithm. For each S,C ∈ N such that S ⊆ C and each%∈ ×i∈NDtopi ,
define TC(S,C,%) ≡ S ∪i∈S top(C,%i) . Next, for each i ∈ N , each C ∈ Ci, and each
%∈ ×i∈NDtopi , let TC1({i}, C,%) ≡ TC({i}, C,%) . Once TCt({i}, C,%) is defined for
some integer t ≥ 1, let TCt+1({i}, C,%) ≡ TC[TCt({i},%), C,%] It is immediate that
for each i ∈ N , each C ∈ Ci, and each %∈ ×i∈NDtopi ,
TC#C({i}, C,%) = TC[TC#C({i},%), C,%].
Finally, for each i ∈ N , each C ∈ Ci, and each %∈ ×i∈NDtopi , define
TC∗({i}, C,%) ≡ TC#C({i}, C,%).
Let %∈ ×i∈NDtopi . Define
N(1,%) ≡ N,
S(1,%) = {i ∈ N(1,%) s.t. {i} ∈ ∩j∈TC∗({i},N,%)TC∗({j}, N,%)}.
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Once, N(t,%) and S(t,%) are defined for some integer t ≥ 1, define
N(t+ 1,%) ≡ N(t,%) \ S(t,%),
S(t+ 1,%) ≡ {i ∈ N(t,%) s.t. {i} ∈ ∩j∈TC∗({i},N(t+1,%),%)TC∗({j}, N(t+ 1,%),%)}.
Note that for each %∈ ×i∈NDtopi , there is an integer t′ ≤ n such that N(t′ + 1,%) = ∅.
Moreover, the algorithm chooses a unique partition of the society for every preference
profile. Then, we can define a coalition formation rule in the following fashion.
Top-Covering Rule. Let the rule ϕtop : ×i∈NDtopi → Σ be such that for each i ∈ N
and each %∈ ×i∈NDtopi , if i ∈ S(t,%), then ϕtopi (%) = TC∗({i}, N(t,%),%).
Alcalde and Revilla [2] have proven that the top covering rule satisfies strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency in the domain ×i∈NDtopi . More-
over, by the iterative definition of ϕtop, and using similar arguments to those in Theorem
1, we see that ϕtop satisfies non-bossiness. As D+ ⊂ ×i∈NDtopi , the top covering rule
satisfies our axioms in D+i .
In order to find a strategy-proof and non-single-lapping rule on the domain of bottom
preferences, we recall ϕ−SP defined on Example 2 of the text.
Let N = {j, k, l}. For each %∈ ×i∈ND−i , let
IRj(%) ≡ {C ∈ Cj, such that for each j′ ∈ C,C %j′ {j′}} .
Let ϕ−SP be such that for each %∈ ×i∈ND−i , ϕ−SPj (%) ≡ top(IRj(%),%j) and for each
j′ /∈ top(IRj(%),%j), ϕ−SPj′ (%) ≡ {j′}.
Note that for every %∈ ×i∈ND−i , ϕ−SPj is j’s preferred coalition from a set of coalitions
that does not depends on j’s preferences. Hence, for each %∈ ×i∈ND−i , and each %′j∈ D−j ,
ϕ−SPj %j ϕ−SPj (%N\{j},%′j).
Next, we check that the remaining members of the society cannot manipulate ϕ−SP on
the domain of bottom preferences. Let %∈ ×i∈ND−i and %′k∈ D−k . Let (%N\{k},%′k) =%′.
We consider four cases:
• ϕ−SPk (%) = {k} but ϕ−SPk (%′ 6= {j}. Since j’s preferences do not change from % to
%′, necessarily ϕk(%′) ∈ IRj(%′), but ϕk(%′) /∈ IRj(%). Thus, {k} k ϕ−SP (%′),
and ϕ−SPk (%) %k ϕk(%′).
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• ϕ−SPk (%) 6= {k}, but ϕ−SPk (%′) = {k}. Note that ϕ−SPk (%) ∈ IRi(%) implies that
ϕ−SPk (%) k {k}. Then, ϕ−SPk (%) %k ϕk(%′).
• ϕ−SPk (%) = {j, k} and ϕ−SPk (%′) = {j, k, l}. Note that since l preferences do
not change, if {j, k, l} ∈ IRj(%′), then {j, k, l} %′k {k}. As %′k∈ D−k , this im-
plies that {j, k} %′k {k}, and {j, k} ∈ IRj(%′). Thus, {j, k, l} ∈ IRj(%′) but
{j, k, l} /∈ IRj(%) . Then, {k} k {j, k, l}, and ϕ−SPk (%) %k ϕk(%′).
• ϕ−SPk (%) = {j, k, l} and ϕ−SPk (%′) = {j, k}. Note that {j, k, l} ∈ IRj(%) implies
that {j, k, l} k {k}. Since %k∈ D−k , {j, k, l} j {j} implies {j, k, l} k {j, k}.
Then, ϕ−SPk (%) %k ϕk(%′).
We can apply the same argument to agent l to conclude that ϕ−SP satisfies strategy-
proofness on the domain of bottom preferences if there are only three agents.
Unfortunately, if there are at least four agents in the society, then ϕ−SP does not
satisfy strategy-proofness in ×i∈ND−i . However, we can design strategy-proof rules in this
domain for large societies by embedding rules like ϕ−SP in a tree-structure as we did in
Example 7.
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Figure 1: Example 1, A Hierarchical Organization.
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